Monday, 25 April 2011

Microeconomic Analysis - Lecture Notes

Contents:
Topic 2.1 Consumer Theory…………………………………………………....1
Topic 2.2 The Utility Function…………………………………………………5
Topic 2.3 Demand Analysis…………………………………………………..11
Topic 2.4 Revealed Preference Theory…………………………………….17
Topic 2.5 Measuring A Utility Curve………………………………………..20
Topic 3.1 Production Function……………………………………………….24
Topic 3.2 Cost Minimisation………………………………………………….27
Topic 3.3 Homogeneous Production Function………………………..…30
Topic 4.0 Choice under uncertainty………………………………………..35
Topic 4.1 Decision Rules………………………………………………………36
Topic 4.2 Expected Values…………………………………………………...38
Topic 4.3 Expected Utility…………………………………………………….40
Topic 5.0: Theory of the Industry…………………………………………..45
Topic 5.1: Monopoly…………………………………………………………...46
Topic 5.2: Price Discrimination……………………………………………...49
Topic 5.3: Oligopoly…………………………………………………………….51
Topic 5.4: Collusive Oligopoly……………………………….……………...58
Topic 6.1: Profit Maximisation………………………………………………62
Topic 6.2: Managerial Discretion Models…………………………………66
Topic 7.1: Robinson-Crusoe Models………………………………………..69
Topic 7.2: Robinson-Crusoe and Man Friday Economic Model……...71
Topic 7.3: Several Outputs……………………………………………………73
Topic 7.4: International Trade………………………………………………76
Topic 8.0: General Equilibrium Theory………………………………….…79
Topic 8.1: Model Set-Up…………………………………………………….…80
Topic 8.2: Conditions for a Competitive Equilibrium…………………..81
Topic 9.0: Welfare Economics……………………………………………….89
Topic 9.1: The Pareto Criteria……………………………………………….90
Topic 9.2: Welfare Maximisation……………………………………………91
Topic 9.3: Welfare Properties of General Equilibrium…………………94
Topic 9.4: Criticisms of the Pareto Postulates…………………………..96
Index……………………………………………………………………………….98



good 1
good 2
Topic 2.1: Consumer Theory
Neoclassical Consumer Theory (NCT)
- Usual indifference curves and utility function for year one.
Examine consumer preferences
Indifference Curves
Examine restrictions that must be placed on individual preferences in order to
derive the conventional indifference curves:
We work with bundles
of n goods,
x = (x1 , x2…, xn)
y = (y1, y2…, yn)
i) Preference Relation
Describes preferences of the representative individual
- Denoted by R (or ≥ or >=)
xRy Bundle x is at least preferred as bundle y
xIy Indifferent between x and y
xRy and yRx
xPy x is strictly preferred to y
xRy and y NOT R x
ii) Indifference Set
For some given bundle r = (r1, r2…, rn) we define the following:
Upper Set of r: Ur = {x: xRr}
Preferences Income Prices
Choices
Indifference Curve Budget Constraint
Demand for goods

good 1
good 2
Ur
Lr
Ir
Lower Set of r: Lr = {x: rRx}
This gives the indifference set of r: Ir: Ur AND Lr
Or Ir = {x: xRr and rRx}
Or Ir = {x: xIr}
In general, we have (2-good case)
iii) Restrictions on R
The question we ask is what minimal conditions must be placed on
individual preferences R such that Ir is just the conventional
indifference curve?
a. Completeness (or comparability)
For any two bundles, x and y, either the individual thinks xRy or
yRx – or possibly both
b. Transitivity
If xRy and yRz, then xRz.
This ensures the indifference curves do not cross.
c. Reflexivity
For any x, xRx
This ensures x is in its own indifference set
If (a), (b) and (c) are satisfied, then R is said to be a weak
preference ordering i.e. the bundles can be ordered from the
most preferred to the least preferred with possibility or
indifference (i.e. weak ordering)
d. Axiom of Greed (or (local) non-satiation or
monotonicity)
“More is preferred to less”
For any x and y, xi ≥ yi – for all i, and xj > yj, for some j then
xPy

good 1
good 2
xPr
rPx Ir
r
r1
r2
E.g. n = 4
x = (2, 5, 7, 3) and y = (2, 3, 4, 3)
Then xPy by Axiom of Greed
Axiom of Greed is a powerful assumption with 3 main
implications:
1. Indifference Set is a line
Suppose indifference set is not a line, then xPy, so x NOT
I y = contradiction
2. Indifference Set must slope downwards to the right
3. Individual must be on budget constraints
e. Continuity and Smoothness
Continuity – no breaks
MRS21 always exists
(Marginal Rate Substitution)
Smoothness – no kinks
MRS21 changes gradually
(Marginal Rate Substitution)
1
2
1
2

f. Strict Convexity
Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS)
diminishes as we move the indifference
line – “variety is the spice of life”
- consumers chose some of every good
We now have an indifference curve
1
2

Topic 2.2: The Utility Function
The Utility Function
i) Utility
Pleasure or satisfaction an individual gets from consumption.
For analytical purposes, it is useful to have a utility function –
summarising the information in the indifference curves.
For each bundle of goods, x, the utility function assigns a number
U = u(x), such that:
xPy 􀃙 u (x) > u (y)
xIz 􀃙 u (x) = u (z)
Utility, u, is measured on an ordinal number scale.
e.g. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th…
i.e. no significance can be given to precise magnitudes only that
one utility is higher (or the same) as another. It gives a ranking
only.
NOTE: It used to be thought that utility could be measured exactly
(i.e. on a cardinal scale)
EXAMPLE:
X = {x, y, z, w}
xIyPzPw
The following utility functions are equivalent representations of
these preferences:
Utility Functions
Bundles U1 U2 U3
X 4 16 10
Y 4 16 10
Z 3 9 8
U 2 4 6
Two points to consider:
a. Utility is unique up to an order – presuming transformation (i.e.
positive monotone transformation)
e.g. U2 = U12, U3 = 2 x U1+2
b. Interpersonal utility comparisons are not possible.
e.g. suppose individuals A and B have the same preference over
X, as above.
Lets give A U1 and B U3 – This does not mean that B prefers X
more than A, as we could have given A U2

ii) Properties of Utility Function
a. Existence of Utility Function
Any weak preference ordering (i.e. satisfying completeness,
transitivity, and reflexivity) can be represented by a utility
function, providing preferences are continuous. (See seminar
sheet one, on lexicographic preferences)
b. Quasi-concavity
If axiom of greed and strict convexity holds, the utility
function is quasi-concave
i.e. bundles of goods giving constant levels of utility will
give conventional indifference curves.
c. Differentiable
For this we need smoothness
FROM NOW ON WE USE x AND y TO DENOTE GOODS, RATHER
THAN BUNDLES
iii) Implications of Differentiability
Marginal Rate of Substitution
The utility function is U = u (x,y)
The total differential of this is:
dU = (∂u/∂x) * dx + (∂u/∂y) * dy
Along an indifference curve, utility does not change.
i.e du = 0
Impose this constraint:
0 = (∂u/∂x) * dx + (∂u/∂y) * dy
dy * (∂u/∂y) = - dx * (∂u/∂x)
(dy/dx) (= slope of indifference curve) = (-∂u/∂x) / (∂u/∂y)
i.e. MRSYX = - MUx
MUy
Hence, if we want to find the MRSyx (i.e. rate at which y can be
substituted for x at the marginal rate, keeping utility constant),
then we can find this from the marginal utilities.


Handout Notes
Optimisation
The basis for much of economic analysis is optimisation. Agents maximise (or
minimise) some objective function subject to constraints that define a feasible set of
alternatives available to the agent. The following problem illustrates the way in
which mathematics is used in economics.
Example: The Consumer
max u(x, y) subject to px x + py y ≤ M (x, y ≥ 0) (1)
x, y
x and y are choice variables whose values are pre-determined by the agent, while px
and py are parameters (ie. parametric prices) whose values are outside the agent's
control (ie. they are market determined and exogenous to the agent). In the above
problem, income M is also a parameter.
To solve this problem we form the Lagrangian L, which is a function of x, y and the
Lagrange multiplier λ:
max L(x, y, λ) = u(x, y) + λ (M - px x - py y) (x, y ≥ 0) (2)
x, y, λ
The solution to (2) solves (1). Since L is a function of more than one variable, we
solve this problem using partial differentiation:
∂L / ∂x = ∂u / ∂x - λ px = 0
∂L / ∂y = ∂u / ∂y - λ py = 0
Since ∂u / ∂x is the marginal utility of x (which we can write MUx), and ∂u / ∂y is the
marginal utility of y (which we can write MUy), the above conditions give:
MUx / px = MUy / py (= λ) (3)
This is the Principle of Equi-Marginal Returns.
The third condition ∂L / ∂λ = 0 gives the constraint px x + py y = M (4)
Solving (3) and (4) together it is possible to derive the consumer's demands for goods
x and y, denoted x* and y*. These are a function of the parameters of the model (ie. px,
py and M), so that we can derive the conventional demand functions as follows:
x* = x(px, py, M) and y* = y(px, py, M)
As well as the first-order conditions, we should check that the second-order
conditions are satisfied, to make sure we have a maximum rather than a minimum or
point of inflection (or more generally a saddle point).


Handout Notes
Mathematical Properties
(a) Sets
A set is convex if a straight line connecting any two points in the set lies entirely
within the set. More formally, a set Z is convex if for any x, y ∈ Z then {μ x + (1 - μ)
y} ∈ Z, where 0 ≤ μ ≤ 1.
convex non-convex
A set is closed if it includes the boundary, while a set is bounded if a circle can be
drawn around the set, no matter how large the circle.
closed (not convex) not bounded
(b) Functions
A function is continuous if there are no 'breaks' in the function. More formally, if lim
f(x) exists and equals f(h) as x tends to h for each h in the domain of the function f.
A function is smooth if it continuous and there are no 'kinks' in the function. A
smooth function has a continuous derivative, and it can therefore be differentiated.
Smoothness and twice differentiability are essentially equivalent.
A continuous function is convex if it 'looks convex' which viewed from ‘below’.
More formally, f is convex if for any x and y, then:
f(μ x + (1 - μ) y) ≤ μ f(x) + (1 - μ) f(y) where 0 ≤ μ ≤ 1.
Strict convexity rules out any straight-line segments (substitute '<' for '≤' in the above). The converse implies concavity and strict concavity. x y x y

Microeconomic Analysis Handout Notes smooth and strictly convex convex and non-smooth discontinuous When a function is a function of more than one variable we can also define quasiconvexity and quasi-concavity. The latter is of more interest to economists. In three dimensions a (strictly) concave function is as follows: (strictly) concave (strictly) quasi-concave A (strictly) quasi-concave function may be 'bell-shaped', and is defined formally by: f(μ x + (1 - μ) y) ≥ μ f(x) + (1 - μ) f(y), where now f(x) = f(y), so μ f(x) + (1 - μ) f(y) = f(x) = f(y). A concave function is also quasi-concave, but the converse does not follow. Existence and Uniqueness The two theorems below give sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a solution to an optimisation problem, such as the consumer problem above. Existence Theorem An optimisation problem has a solution if: (a) the objective function is continuous (b) the feasible set is non-empty, closed and bounded set.

Microeconomic Analysis Handout Notes Uniqueness Theorem The solution to an optimisation problem is unique if: (a) the objective function is (strictly) quasi-concave (b) the feasible set is (strictly) convex. and at least one of (a) and (b) holds strictly. Existence Non-existence Here, the feasible set is not bounded above (i.e. shaded area continues upwards, but not shown), so that no solution exists Existence, but Non-Uniqueness Here, both (a) and (b) of the second theorem do not hold strictly, so that there is no uniqueness (the conditions are sufficient, but not necessary) Here, the feasible set is convex, but the objective function is not even quasiconcave (it produces both local and global optima) non-empty, closed and bounded feasible set optimal solution continuous objective function multiple equilibria local equilibrium global equilibrium

Microeconomic Analysis Topic 2.3: Demand Analysis i) Marshallian Demand Function Consumer optimisation problem: max u(x.y) x,y s.t. px * x + py * y = M Solution: 1. Tangency: MRSyx (=slope of k) = (- px/py) (=slope budg const) 2. budget constraint: pxx + pyy = M 􀃆 solving (1) and (2) simultaneously gives the Marshallian Demand Function x* = Dx (px, py, M) y* = Dy (py, px, M) NOTE: Tastes are reflected in functions Given the quasi-concavity of the utility function (i.e. convexity of the indifference curves) then x* and y* exist and are unique. ii) Elasticises As economists, we are often interested in how responsive x* and y* (demand) are to changes in parameters of the model (prices and income). We use elasticity (proportionate change): - independent of units of measurement (i.e. pennies, pounds, or dollars, likewise by tins, crates or ‘00s of units) - can give economic interpretation -- See Hand Out Below -- x y budget constraint x* y*

Microeconomic Analysis Income elasticity a 􀃆 b: x is a normal good (ex^m > 0)
b 􀃆 c: x is an inferior good (ex^m < 0) iii) Marshallian Demand Curves In case good x, we examine how demand for x (x*) varies the price of x (px). Changes in x* = Dx (px, py, M), holding py and M (income) constant. This gives the offer curve, from which the demand curve is constructed. offer curve = locus of optimal position Dx = demand curve retraces the offer curve on a different plane. If offer curve bends backwards, we get upwards sloping demand curves (Giffen Good) y y* a b c x* x x* M a . b . c . y y* a b c x*a x*b x*c x slope - px py x* a . b . c . offer curve Px x*a x*b x*c Demand Curve Dx

Microeconomic Analysis x uo B y* y A . A . B px x* hx x*A x*B iv) Hicksian Demand Function Proves useful in economic analysis. This is the dual problem, whereby consumers minimise expenditure subject to achieving some utility level, Uo min (px * x + py * y) x,y 􀃆 subject to u(x,y) >= uo
The Hicksian Demand Functions:
x* = hx (px, py, uo)
y* = hy (py, px, u0)
We can construct the Hicksian demand curve
In case of x, we vary px, keeping py and uo fixed.
x
uo
x*
y*
y


For any price py, the Hicksian Demand Curve (hx), tells us the
demand for x at each price px, which gives utility uo at minimum
expenditure.
Since utility is constant, hx gives the substitution effect. Hence,
hx is also known as the (income) compensated demand curve.
Since the substitution effect is inversely related to the price, then
hx always slopes downwards to the right.
v) Slutsky Equation
We can decompose the total effect from a price change into
substitution and income effects.
In algebraic form:
∂Dx = ∂hx - ∂Dx * x
∂px ∂px ∂m


Handout Notes
The Marshallian demand function for good x is: x* = Dx (px, py, M).
There is an elasticity associated with each argument of the demand function, px, py
and M.
(a) Income Elasticity of Demand (ex
M)
ex
M = (∂x / x) / (∂M / M) = (∂x / ∂M) / (x / M)
Since x and M are positive, the sign is determined by ∂x / ∂M.:
(i) ∂x / ∂M > 0, then ex
M > 0, and x is normal (if ex
M >1 then luxury, but
otherwise the normal good is known as a necessity).
(ii) ∂x / ∂M < 0, then ex M < 0, and x is inferior. (b) Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand (ex y) ex y = (∂x / x) / (∂py / py) = (∂x / ∂py) / (x / py) In this case, the sign depends on ∂x / ∂py, that is, how demand for x changes in response to a change in the price of the related good, y: (i) ∂x / ∂py > 0, then ex
y > 0, and x and y are substitutes.
(ii) ∂x / ∂py < 0, then ex y < 0, and x and y are complements. (c) [Own-Price] Elasticity of Demand (ex) ex = (∂x / x) / (∂px / px) = (∂x / ∂px) / (x / px) In this case, the sign is negative, as the downward-sloping demand curve means that ∂x / ∂px < 0, so that ex < 0. For the Giffen good the elasticity is positive, but in general the sign is ignored, as it carries no information. Again, there are two cases: (i) |∂x / ∂px | > 1, then x is elastic.
(ii) |∂x / ∂px | < 1, then x is inelastic. Demand for an elastic good is relatively price responsive, and as a result the total revenue paid (the price multiplied by the quantity) decreases as the price increases. A firm would be silly to raise the price of such a good as the revenue it receives would fall!

Microeconomic Analysis Handout Notes (a) The Marshallian Demand Function Find the Marshallian demand functions for x and y, for the utility function u = u(x, y) = x2 + 2 y2, where px, py and M are parametric. The maximisation problem is: max x2 + 2 y2, x, y subject to px x + py y = M. (1) This is a constrained maximisation problem, which can be solved using the Lagrangian technique. However, as a more direct method, we know that at the optimum there is a tangency between an indifference curve and the budget constraint, i.e. MRSyx = - px / py. Note that MRSyx = - MUx / MUy, where MUx (marginal utility of x) equals ∂u / ∂x, and MUy (marginal utility of y) equals ∂u / ∂y. Hence, MRSyx = - MUx / MUy = - 2x / 4y, so that for a tangency, 2 x py = 4 y px. (2) To find the demand functions we have a pair of equations in x and y, (1) and (2), that can be solved simultaneously. Equation (2) is the condition for a tangency, and equation (1) gives the budget constraint where this tangency occurs. They are equations in two unknowns, x and y, where px, py and M are parameters (i.e. unspecified constants). Solving these, and after some algebra, gives the Marshallian demand functions: x* = 2 px M / (2 px 2 + py 2) and y* = py M / (2 px 2 + py 2). When px = 1, py = 2 and M = 100, then x* = 200 / 6 and y* = 200 / 6, for example. (b) The Elasticity of Demand For the Marshallian demand function x* = Dx(px, py, M) = (2 M – 3 px) / py, find the income elasticity of demand, ex M, when px = 1, py = 4 and M = 2 (all in suitable units). We know ex M = (∂x / ∂M) (M / x). From the demand function: ∂x / ∂M = 2 / py, and inverting the demand function gives 1 / x = py / (2 M – 3 px). Substitution gives ex M = [2 / py] M [py / (2 M – 3 px)], which equals 2 M / (2 M – 3 px). For example, when px = 1, py = 4 and M = 2, then ex M = 4, i.e. x is a luxury good.

Microeconomic Analysis Topic 2.4: Revealed Preference Theory Revealed Preference Theory (RPT) makes recognition of the fact that indifference curves are not known. RPT attempts to derive the results of the neoclassical consumer theory (NCT), but without using indifference curves, but by observing choices and income/prices. Notation: bundle A = (xA, yA) bundle B = (xB, yB) Definition: A is directly revealed preferred to B, if A is chosen when B is available Axiom: Principle of Revealed Preference A drp B 􀃙 A is preferred to B choice preference Restrictions on Choices RPT approach is axiomatic. There are four axioms. With these we can derive most of the results of the conventional neoclassical consumer theory (NCT) a) Axiom of Greed All income is consumed b) For each budget constraint there exists only one optimal bundle. Suppose not = y like strict convexity Preferences Income Prices Choices

Microeconomic Analysis c) For each optimal bundle, there exists only one budget constraint on which it was chosen Suppose not = y like transitivity d) Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference If A drp B then we cannot have another situation where B drp A. Implies consistency in choice There are other versions, e.g. Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference etc. Example: There substitution effect is inversely related to price. Normally if we use the Hicksian Substitution Effect (i.e. keep utility constant), but now we use the Slutsky substitution effect 􀃆 keeps purchasing power constant. - originally at A - ORS is available at constant PP – where will individual locate? - rule out ORAT (excluding A) by WARP - on the line AS by Axiom of Greed - rule out A by Axiom (c) Hence, resilt – As px falls and x* rises keeping PP constant A . Budget Constraint Keeps P.P. Constant 0 T S X Y R

Microeconomic Analysis Handout Notes Initially, suppose locate at bundle A = (xA, yA) on budget constraint, px A x + py A y = MA. Prices and / or income then change to produce new budget constraint, px B x + py B y = MB, on which locate at bundle B = (xB, yB). There are two results: (a) If MB / MA ≥ Laspeyres Price Index, then B is preferred to A. Note, if income does not change between A and B then the left-hand side is unity. Suppose MB / MA ≥ Laspeyres Price Index. Then, (px B xB + py B yB) / (px A xA + py A yA) ≥ (px B xA + py B yA) / (px A xA + py A yA). i.e., (px B xB + py B yB) ≥ (px B xA + py B yA). That is, B is direct revealed preferred to A at the new prices. Bundle B is preferred to bundle A by the Principle of Revealed Preference. (b) If MB / MA ≤ Paasche Price Index, then A is preferred to B. Suppose (px B xB + py B yB) / (px A xA + py A yA) ≤ (px B xB + py B yB) / (px A xB + py A yB). Then (px A xA + py A yA) ≥ (px A xB + py A yB). That is, A is direct revealed preferred to B at the old prices, so A is preferred to B. (c) General Notes (i) If MB / MA < LPI then A could be preferred to B, or A could be preferred to B, so that we can say nothing. Likewise, if MB / MA > PPI. Thus, these are
sufficient conditions only, but they are not necessary.
(ii) If preferences are transitive, then at most one of (a) and (b) can hold, but
possibly neither.


y
x
y
x
px
A 􀃆 B
A B
px
x
B
A
px
Consumer
Surplus of A
Consumer
Surplus of B
Topic 2.5: Measuring A Utility Curve
A fall in the price of a good makes the individual better off.
Q: But much how much?
Frequently need to answer this
question, such as cost-benefitanalysis
e.g. new airport being built
Problem: Utility is measured
ordinally i.e. just gets given a
ranking.
i) Change in Consumer Surplus
Consumer Surplus: individual valuation of goods over and above
the price paid (Δ Consumer Surplus is in monetary units)
Problem: as we move between A and B the value of money
changes
Justification: - as price of x falls (-px falls) and real incomes
change, the real value of money is altered.
- Dx holds nominal income constant but not real
income
ii) Monetary Valuation
Examine individual’s monetary valuation of the utility of change. To
keep the real value of income constant, we keep relative prices
constant (effectively eliminating income effect).
Two measures –as relative prices can be held constant at A or at B:



a. Compensating Variation (CV)
For a price fall, the CV is a sum of money which can be taken in
a new position and leave the individuals as well off as before.
Here, relative prices are fixed at a new level (at B).
b. Equivalent Variation (EV)
For a price fall, EV is the sum of money given in the initial
position which gives the utility level.
Relative Prices
are those at A
Note: cv and
ev are likely to
differ.
In practice,
tend to use cv,
as B is
observed.
iii) Measuring the Monetary Valuation
The CV is the area under the Hicksian (or compensated) demand
curve, over the relevant price range.
A .
x
y
{
B .
D .
UA UB
cv
py
cv = py * Δy
Δy = cv
py
A .
x
y
{
B .
C .
UA UB
ev
py


This makes sense as the Hicksian Demand Curve eliminates the
income effects, so the real value of money is constant.
As the handout on ‘Measuring a Utility Change’ shows:
- E.V. is the area indifferent to hx, where utility is UB
- We note: CV < ΔCS < E.V. - This is because x is normal. - If x is inferior: CV > ΔCS > E.V.
This is the theory, but Hicksian Demand Curves are not directly observed – so
what do we do?
In practice we use the aggregate Marshallian demand curve. However,
error is likely to be small if:
a. x is normal for some individuals and inferior for others
b. price change is small
c. x accounts for a small share of expenditure
d. preferences are quasi-linear (i.e. zero income effects)
X
Y
.
.


Handout Notes


Topic 3.1: Production Function
Maximum output from combining inputs:
Q = output
inputs { L = labour (services)
{ K = capital (services)
Assume:
- Q, L, K are perfectly divisible (continuous rather than discrete)
- free disposal (learning factors idle is costless)
There are two broad approaches:
1) Linear Programming Approach
Finite number of production processes (Pi) Each Pi combines factors in
fixed proportions (fixed-proportions technology)
Example:
Suppose P1 and P2 only:
1 Unit of Q P1 P2
Labour (L) 1 2
Capital (K) 2 1
P1 has a capital-labour ratio of 2, and P2 of ½
Considering this, we can now sketch the feasible region for L and K that
produces Q=4 using P1 and P2
P1 P2 Q L K
A 0 4 4 8 4
B 1 3 4 7 5
C 2 2 4 6 6
D 3 1 4 5 7
E 4 0 4 4 8
0 2 4 6 8
8
6
4
2
0
K
L
- E (P1)
- D
- C
- B
- A (P2)
goes flat as could take on
capital and not in use it
Q=4
goes flat as could take on
labour and not in use it
Q=4
isoquant
[FEASIBLE REGION]


• Positions to the right of the line (in the feasible region) are technically
possible, but only points on the boundary line itself are efficient
• Positions outside the feasible region are technically not possible with
the existing state of knowledge
• Only points on the boundary are efficient and this is isoquant
• There is an isoquant for each output level.
Consider the addition of processes P3 and P4
1 Unit of Q P3 P4
Labour (L) 5/4 7/4
Capital (K) 5/4 7/4
How does this effect the isoquant?
P3 P4 Q L K
F 4 0 4 5 5
G 0 4 4 7 7
Note: G lies within the feasible region 􀃆 P4 is inefficient, and never used.
F lies below the isoquant 􀃆 P3 is efficient and changes the shape of
the isoquant (- - - line shows new).
As more and more production processes are added, then in limit, the
isoquant becomes strictly convex to the origin.
2) The Neoclassical Approach
As the no of Pi 􀃆 ∞, then we get the neoclassical isoquant.
0 2 4 6 8
8
6
4
2
0
K
L
- E (P1)
- D
- C
- B
- A (P2)
Q=4
*
F (P3)
* G (P4)
combines
P2 and P3
combines
P1 and P3
K
L
Q=Q0


The isoquants are summarised by production function, Q=f(L,K)
It gives the maximum output (Q) from L and K
[The slope of the isoquant is the Marginal Rate of (Technical) Substitution
of K for L (MRTSKL)]
- Rate at which K substitutes for L at the margin keeping output
constant
MRTSKL diminishes as moves down the isoquant.
The total differential of the production function, Q=f(L,K)
dQ = ∂f * dL + ∂f * dK
∂L ∂K
Along the isoquant, output does not change (dQ=0), and rearranging
dK = - ∂f/∂L
dL ∂f/∂K
MRTSKL = - MPL / MPK
As move down the isoquant:
L MPL
K MPK
} MRTSKL


Topic 3.2: Cost Minimisation
Firms minimise costs of producing output:
• Implies efficiency
• Necessary condition for public maximisation
If the firm is not minimising costs, then it is not on the short run total cost
(SRTC) curve, and profits are correspondingly lower.
To find the cost-minimisation position in (L, K) – space, then we need the
concept of an iso-cost curve:
Co = w * L + r * K
The is where: w = wage rate on units of labour services
r = rental on unit of capital service
We can rearrange this iso-cost to get:
K = (w/r) * L + (C0/r)
NOTE: The smaller the cost (Co)), the closer the iso-cost is to the origin
K
L
slope = - w
r
iso-cost
Co
r
£
Q
MR
Short Run Total Costs (diminishing
marginal productivity)
MC
SR Total
Revenue
π
FC


The Cost Function
The various cost curves, TC, AC and MC, are summarised algebraically by the
cost function.
It is derived as follows:
min (w*L + r*K)
L,K
s.t. Q = f(L,K) ≥ Qo
L* and K* produce Qo at minimum
cost. It occurs where there is a
tangency between isoquant (giving
Qo) and iso-cost curves
Now we will solve this problem (cost-minimisation) in general terms.
NOTE: In seminar 3 the cost-minimisation is solved giving explicit form to
production function.
Cost-minimisation problem has necessary conditions.
1) Tangency Condition: MRTSKL = - w/r
(slope of (slope of
isoquant) iso-cost)
2) Constraint Condition: f(L,K) = Qo
Generally 1) and 2) can be solved by L and K, to give compensated factor
demands.
L* = L (w,r, Qo)
K* = K(r,w,Qo)
Therefore the minimum cost of producing Qo is:
C (cost) = w * (L*) + r * (K*)
􀃎 C = w * L(w,r,Qo) + r * K (r,w, Qo)
􀃎 C = c(w,r, Qo)
Since this holds true for an Q0 the cost function is:
C = c(w,r,Q)
K
L
Co
r
Qo
Iso-cost
curve
Cost
Min
L*
K*


The cost function gives the minimum cost of producing any output Q, given w
and r.
Plotted C against Q gives the total cost curve:
Likewise we can get the average cost:
AC = c(w,r,Q)
Q
LRMC = dc(w,r,Q)
dQ
Economies of Scale
From C=c(w,r,Q), consider the elasticity of cost (c) with respect to output(Q).
Suppose we find e < 1 • LMC / LAC < 1 • LAC > LMC
􀃎 Economies of Scale
C (£’s)
Q
LMC
LAC
Diseconomies
of Scale
Economies of
Scale
e = d c/c = Proportionate Change Cost .
d Q/Q Proportionate Change Output
C
Q
e = (dc)/(dQ) = LRMC = Long Run MC
c/Q LAC Long Run AC
C (£’s)
Q
LRTC (Long Run Total Costs)
C
Q


K
0
L
L
K
L
K
Topic 3.3: Homogeneous Production Function
Useful class of production function
For Q = f(t, k), we say f is homogeneous of degree n if:
f(sL, sK) = sn, f(L, K)
where s is (> 0) is scale parameter
When n > 1 􀃎 increasing returns to scale
When n = 1 􀃎 constant returns to scale
When n < 1 􀃎 DRS n = 1 is known as linearly homogenous p.f. i. Cobb-Douglas Production Function Most widely used form: Q = A * La * Kβ A = efficiency parameter (technological progress) Aβ > 0 = distribution parameters (see seminar 3)
The C-D p.f. is homogenous of degree θ and β
Proof: Consider L0, K0 such that Q0 = A * Lθ * Kβ
Now increase input by s, then:
QN = A * (s * L0)θ * (s * K0)β
= A * sθ * L0
θ * sβ * K0
β
= sθ * sβ * A * L0
θ * K0
β
= (sβ + θ) * Q0 􀃎 (Q0 = A * L0
θ * K0
β)
NOTE: CRS when θ + β = 1
ii. Linearly Homogenous Production Function
e.g. Q = L½ * K½ Exhibit CRS
They have the following properties:
a) MPL and MPK depend on L/X only (see sheet for proof, NOT examinable)
Implication of this is that the
isoquants’ are just ‘blownup’
versions of one another.
WHY? Slope of isoquant
= MRTSKL = (-MPL)/(MPK)
which depends on L/K
only.


b) Output Expansion Paths are Linear
OEP = locus of all cost-minimisation positions keeping relative factor
prices constant.
Cost-minimisation condition: slope of isoquant = slope of isocost
MRTSKL = -w/r
c) Factor Demands are Non-Giffen
NOTE: a profit-maximising firm must minimise costs
Suppose initially at A:
Focus on demand for labour. Position A gives one point on DL
Now, suppose w and Q . Consider substitution and output effect (s.e
and o.e)
Fall in w decreases slope of isoquant. Then bring back down Qπ man
curve.
Total effect: A 􀃆 C
Sub effect: A 􀃆 B
Output effect: B 􀃆 C
K
0
L
A
B
Slope = -w/r
Qπman
s.e slope = -w/r N
Da
L
w = wage rate
K
0
L
OEP
Slope = - w/r


Note: In response to price fall the demand for labour must increase. This
is because OE always reinforces the SE.
d) Euler’s Theorem
For a linear homogeneous pf the following holds:
Q = (∂f/∂L) * L + (∂f/∂K) * K
See handout
Implication:
In perfect competition, the factors are employed up to where marginal
products equal real factor payment
i.e. MPL = ∂f = w and MPX = ∂f = r
∂L p ∂K p
Substitute these into Euler’s equation,
Q = (w/p)L + (r/p)K
= p.Q = w * L + r*K
􀃆 Firms in perfect competition must make normal profits
Hence, also knows a Product Exhaustion Theorem
For a homogeneous p.f. with I.R.S (increasing returns to scale) the
relationship is:
Q < (∂f/∂L)L + (∂f/∂K)K This implies that a competitive firm experiencing IRS will make a loss! Hence, never observe competitive firm operating under this. WHY? IRS 􀃎 economies of scale, decreasing LAC LAR = LMR LAC LMC output K Q* Break Even Loss 􀃆 AC > AR
As gap gets
bigger, π rises


Perfect competition 􀃎 price taker, constant LAR
Maximum profits: MR = MC
Q* actually minimises loss.
For profit max:
- MR = MC (first order condition)
- MR cuts MC from above (second order condition)
NOTE: This market is likely to observe a monopoly.
Natural Monopolies: telecoms, gas, water etc
If unregulated, then monopolies naturally occur in markets with very large
fixed costs giving rise to decreasing long run average costs over the whole
market.


Handout Notes
Result 1: For a linearly homogeneous production function (i.e.
exhibiting constant returns to scale) the marginal products, MPL and
MPK, depend on the labour-capital ratio only, i.e. L / K.
For production function Q = f(L, K), we know sQ = f(sL, sK), where s is the scale
parameter. So let s = 1 / K (i.e. whatever value K takes, set s equal to one over this).
Then, Q / K = f(L / K, 1), that is Q / K = g(L / K), or Q = K g(L / K).
Now, use product, quotient and chain rules to differentiate Q = K g(L / K) to get:
MPL = ∂Q / ∂L = K g’(L / K) (1 / K) = g’(L / K).
MPK = ∂Q / ∂K = g(L / K) + K g’(L / K) (-L / K2) = g(L / K) - g’(L / K) (L / K).
where g’(L / K) is the first derivative of g(L / K) with respect to L / K.
We see from the above that MPL and MPK depend on L / K only, and hence result.
Result 2 (Euler’s Theorem): For a linearly homogeneous production
function, Q = f(L, K), the following holds: Q = (∂f / ∂L) L + (∂f / ∂K)
K.
For a homogeneous production function: snQ = f(sL, sK), where Q = f(L, K).
Partially differentiate sn f(L, K) = f(sL, sK) with respect to s, to get:
n s n-1 f(L, K) = (1 / s) [(∂f / ∂L) L + (∂f / ∂L) K].
(Here, we use the fact that ∂f / ∂s = (∂f / ∂L) (∂L / ∂sL) (∂sL / ∂s), where ∂L / ∂sL = 1
/ s and ∂sL / ∂s = L. Koutsoyiannis (page 479) conducts the same proof, but makes an
error, as she leaves out the (1 / s) term from the right-hand side).
For a linearly homogeneous production function, n = 1, which (since n s n-1 = 1)
gives:
Q = (1 / s) [(∂f / ∂L) L + (∂f / ∂L) K].
Further, this holds for any s, so set s = 1 to get the result.


Topic 4: Choice under uncertainty
Certainty: Associate known outcome (payoff with each action)
e.g. consumer chooses bundle x (action) then gets utility u(x)
(payoff) with certainty
Uncertainty: breaks 1 to 1 correspondence
Two types: 1) Strategic Interdependence
- Do not know how other agents will react (e.g.
oligopoly)
- Endogenous
2) State Contingency
- Do not know what state of nature will occur
(e.g. investor does not know if economy will
grow or not)
- Exogenous
Here we will focus on state contingency
Notation:
States of Nature
Action S1 S2 S3
a1 x11 x12 x13
a2 x21 x22 x33
xij = pay offs
E.g. Action: grows what or not
State of Nature: summer, rainy, sunny, cold


h(a1)
h(a2)
h(ai) 7
5
3
1
2/3 1
Ω
If relatively pessimistic
(or > 2/3) chose a1
Avoids power station
problem
Topic 4.1: Decision Rules
Consider simple decision rules, based on individual psychologies.
1) Extreme Pessimist
Choose action that gives less-worst outcome i.e. maximum strategy
E.g.
Action S1 S2 S3
a1 100(ii) 50 -20(i)
a2 180(ii) -50(i) 50
Would chose a1
2) Extreme Optimist
Adopt maximise strategy
Would chose a2
(ii)
3) Hurwicz Criterion
(i) and (ii) may give implausible predictions, e.g. extreme optimist
may take actions 􀃎 disaster
Example: Nuclear Power Station
f
Extreme optimist builds.
Hurwicz criterion avoids this problem, as a Hurwicz index is formed
E.g.
Index Worst Best
h(a1) = Ω2 + (1-Ω) 5 = 5-3Ω
h(a2) = Ω1 + (1-Ω) 7 = 7-6Ω
Ω(0≤Ω≤1) is pessimism-optimism index
S1 S2
Build £5milion -£5million
Do not Build £3million £3million
Action S1 S2 S3 S4
a1 2 3 5 4
a2 4 5 1 7


Previous Examples:
h(build) = 5 – 5,000,005Ω
h(not build) = 3
h(build) > h(not build) => 5-5,000,005Ω > 3
i.e. extremely optimistic
4) Minimax Regret
More basis in economics
Chose to minimise opportunity cost, i.e. minimise maximum regret.
Example
Action S1 S2 S3
a1 1 4 0
a2 7 2 5
a3 3 1 8
Form the Regret Matrix:
Action S1 S2 S3
a1 6 0 8
a2 0 2 3
a3 4 3 0
- All numbers add up to 7, the highest number in the set
- E.g. a3,S1 is 3 in the set, and add 4 to make it 7
Apply minimax strategy
- chose a2
Avoids Nuclear Power Station problem.


Topic 4.2: Expected Values
Problems with the decision rules, is the likelihood with which different states
occur is likely to affect choice.
1) Subjective Probabilities
Suppose agent has subjective probabilities, pi, about each state si
To support this, we require:
- List of states exhaustive
- States are mutually exclusive
- States are exogenous
For states (s1, s2,…, sn) we define a lottery
p = (n1, n2,…, nn) where
Leads to another decision rule, expected values. Agent chooses
action with highest expected value.
Example
Action S1 S2 S3 S4
a1 2 1 3 5
a2 6 4 1 2
a3 1 2 3 1
Suppose p = (1/10, 2/10, 3/10, 4/10)
EV (a1) = 1/10(2) + 2/10(1) + 3/10(3) + 4/10(5) = 3 3/10
EV (a2) = 1/10(6) + 2/10(4) + 3/10(1) + 4/10(2) = 2 1/2
EV (a3) = 1/10(1) + 2/10(2) + 3/10(3) + 4/10(1) = 1 3/10
Would therefore choose a1
2) Problems with expected values
a) St Petersberg Paradox
Choice is:
a1: £1million with certainty
a2: coin tossed repeatedly. If there is n consecutive
heads, and a tail, prize is £2n
Expected value maximises chooses a2
EV (a2):
Number of heads and then a tail
n = 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Payoff £1 £2 £4 £8 £16 £32 £64
Probability 1/2 1/4 1/8 1/16 1/32 1/64 1/128
1=n
Σ
1=1
pi = 1


EV(a2) = £1/2 + ¼(£2) + 1/8(£4) + 1/16(£8) + 1/32(£16) +
1/64(£32) + 1/128(£64)
= £1/2 + £1/2 + £1/2 + £1/2 + £1/2 + £1/2 = £∞
Hence EV(a2) > EV(a1) = £1million
b) Variance of Payoff
Once probabilities are introduced, then in effect the payoff from
action is a random variable
Expected value maximisation has advantages:
- takes into account all states
- takes account of central technology
Also has disadvantages:
- ignores the variance of payoff
Expected value maximiser is indifferent between a1 and a2 but
a2 has much later variance, i.e. risk.
Example:
S1 S2
a1 -£1 +£1
a2 - House + House
EV (a1) = ½(-£1) + ½(+£1) = 0
EV (a2) = ½(-House) + ½(+House) = 0
Thus, expected values ignore attitude to risk.
-ve Expected Value +ve
a1
a2
Share the same peak


Topic 4.3: Expected Utility
1) Expected Utility Theorem
Change of notation – Agent chooses between prospects, P
{ * P = [(p1, x1)( p2, x2),…, (pn, xn)] * }
pi
= probability
xi
= payoff
i = state of nature
Thus,
S1 S2
a1 60 40 p = (1/4, ¾)
a2 30 50
Choice between prospects:
P = [(1/4, 60)(3/4, 40)]
Q = [(1/4, 30)(3/4, 50)]
The expected utility of a prospect, P, is as follows:
EU (P) = p1.u(x1) + p2.u(x2) ,…, + pn.u(xn)
The central limit theorem of choice under uncertainty, associated
with von-Neumann, and Morgenstein is:
Expected Utility Theorem
Given: weak preference ordering over prospects
axiom of greed
three technical axioms
Then: EU(P) > EU(Q)
􀃎 P is preferred to Q
2) Attitude to risk
The Utility Function u=u(w), where w is wealth, is the expected utility
function
The shape of u(w) tells us about the individuals attitude to risk.
Suppose two prospects, P and Q, with the same expected value, but P
has no variance and Q has some risk.
a. u(w) is strictly concave
u=u(w)
EV
w
u
EU(P)
EU(Q) EU(P) > EU(Q)


EV(P) w
EV(Q)
u=u(w)
u
EU(P)
EU(Q)
By EU Theorem: P is preferred to Q (event though they have
the same expected value).
[A risk averse individual, as they have a strictly concave
ex-post utility function]
This individual derives dis-utility from the presence of risk
􀃎basis for insurance.
b. u(w) is strictly convex
This individual is said to be risk-loving.
Derives pleasure from risk
c. u(w) is linear
Here the EU(P) =
EU(Q)
This individual is said
to be risk-neutral
In this EU max gives
the same result as EV
max
Note: u(w) is not the same as the utility function used in consumer
theory
This is clear: as in the expression for expected utility we added
the u(w) together, so u(w) must be measured cardinally.
We say that u(w) is unique up to an affine (or linear)
transformation. It is stronger than the monotonic (or order
preserving) transformations in consumer theory.
u=u(w)
EV
w
u
EU(P)
EU(Q)
Here, EU(Q) > EU(P)


3) Measuring Risk Aversion
The degree of risk aversion depends on curator of the ex-post utility
function.
An index of risk aversion is the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk
aversion. Hence:
RRA = -w * u’’(w)
u'(w)
u = u(w)
u’(w) = ∂u
∂w
u’’(w) = ∂2u
∂w2
For risk averse individuals, RRA > 0, and RRA increases with risk
aversion.
Example:
Calculate RRA for u(w) = log10w
du = 1 * 1 .
dw w ln10
d2u = 1 ( -1
dw2 = ln10 w2 )
Hence, RRA = 1
This individual displays risk aversion. Indeed any utility function of the
form u(w) = a+b.log10w has RRA = 1
The RRA does have advantages:
- independent of linear transformations
- independent of how wealth is measured (i.e. £’s, £m’s or bags
of sugar!)


Handout Notes


Handout Notes


Topic 5.0: Theory of the Industry
Focus on the competitive relations between firms – market structure.
May be only loosely related to the number of firms.
- e.g. a bakery may have a local monopoly
- e.g. British Gas had a monopoly on gas supply but operated in an
oligopolistic energy market.


Topic 5.1: Monopoly
Monopoly faces the market demand curve. In
inverse form: p = p (q)
This has implications.
i. Marginal Revenue < Price Proof: MR = dTR = d(p.q) dq dq = d[p(q).q) dq = p(q).1 + dp .q dq = p + dp .q (* see diagram below) dq = p [1 + dp . q ] dq p Use the fact that the elasticity of demand, e, is equal to: - dq . p dp q Hence, MR = p[1 – (1/e)] and since e>0, then MR

MR = p(1 – 1/∞) = p
d) Price Discrimination gives the firm a way out of the dilemma
- See below.
ii. Allocative Efficiency
For profit maximisation, MR=MC, but also MR = p(1 – 1/∞) < p 􀃖 p > MR=MC
This implies inefficiency! The marginal benefit of the last unit produced
(price) exceeds the marginal cost (MC)
The price ratio pm/MCm is called the mark-up
Lener suggests 1-1/mark-up is a measure of monopoly power. However, we
can simply this for profit maximising firm:
1 – 1 = 1 – MC/P
P/MC
= 1 – P (1 – 1/e)
P
= 1 – 1 + 1/e
= 1/e
Hence, monopoly power is given by the inverse of the elasticity of demand.
For a competitive firm, e = ∞, so market power is zero.
MR
D
q
£
pM
MCM
MC
qM
Dead-weight welfare loss
(measures allocative
inefficiency of monopoly)


iii. Price Discrimination
To avoid cutting the price as it expands output, monopolists can price
discriminate, so that it changes different prices in different ‘markets’.


Topic 5.2: Price Discrimination
Necessary Conditions:
- More than one ‘market’
- willingness to pay must differ
- Resale possibilities must be limited
- barriers between markets:
- legal
- physical
- informational
- Price making not necessary
Suppose two markets
Condition for profit maximisation:
MR1 = MR2 = MC
Sum MR curves ‘horizontally’ then by construction q1
* + q2
* = q* it gives p1
*
and p2
*.
Notes:
a) If MR1 > MR2 then can not maximise profits. Switch units from market
2 to market 1
b) Since MR1 = MR2
􀃆 p1(1-1/e1) = p2(1-1/e2)
􀃆 When e1 > e2 then p1 < p2. 􀃆 i.e. change lower price in more elastic market (see diagram) c) Price discrimination reflects differences in demand (not costs). Eliminates by resale d) In practice there are three types of price discrimination: - 3rd Degree Price Discrimination Prices vary between individuals, but every unit sold sells at the same price (direct price discrimination) E.g. OAP haircuts on a Monday. - 2nd Degree Price Discrimination q1 p1 p1 * D1 q1 * MR1 q2 p2 p2 * D2 q2 * MR2 £ MR1+2 q* q1q2 Market 1 Market 2 Firm


Microeconomic Analysis Prices vary between units or good, but every individual fares the same price schedule (indirect price discrimination) E.g. Bulk-buying discounts Often 2nd Degree Price Discrimination is accompanied by subtle differences in quality of a good E.g. Leg-room on a aeroplane flight - 1st Degree Price Discrimination Both of the above E.g. Theatre tickets - standby tickets for students (3rd Degree Price Discrimination) - Different seats at different prices (2nd Degree Price Discrimination) For a perfectly price discriminate monopolist, MR=price, so the average revenue (AR) and marginal revenue (MR) are the same. MR D=MR MC q p This then eliminates the welfare cost


Microeconomic Analysis Topic 5.3: Oligopoly Key Features: interdependence of firms Strategic Uncertainty: the payoff from an action depends on how other firms react Duopoly: Firms A and B Inverse market demand function p = p(q) = p(qA + qB) Consider total differential dp = dp * dqA + dp * dqB dqA daB Divide through by dqA dp = dp + dp * dqB dqA dqA dqB dqA Total effect on price of a change in A’s output = direct effect + individual effect as B changes its output in reaction to A’s change in ouput dqB reflects the strategic uncertainty. It is known as A’s conjectural dqA variation. A must therefore guess the variation in B’s output. A similar expression for B exists, whereby dqA/ dqB is known as B’s conhectural variation. There are many models of oligopoly. They vary according to two characteristics - firms set output as prices - firms move simultaneously or in sequence. Note: Also oligopolies may collude. i) Cournot Model Possibly the earliest model (Cournot (1838)) Developed in context of a natural spring where MC = 0. Firms set output and move simultaneously. Assumed that firms ignore interdependence, i.e. ‘zero conjectural variations’ i.e. dqB = 0 (firm A’s belief) and dqA = 0 (firm B’s belief) dqA dqA But of course, these are only true in equilibrium (see handout) Notes:


Microeconomic Analysis a. Cournot equilibrium is an example of a Nash Equilibrium: each agent is doing the best for him/herself given the actions of all other agents (it is an equilibrium or ‘position of rest’). b. We ask four questions of equilibrium: i. Exist? ii. Unique? iii. Stable? – depends whether A’s reaction function cuts B’s r.f. from above) iv. Efficent? – see below c. Each firm behaves as if independent, but reaction functions tell us they are not. A’s rf: qA = 24 – qB 2 => dqA = -½ ≠ 0
dqB
So A always reacts (out of equilibrium)
ii) Stackelberg Model
One firm is sophisticated and recognises interdependence. Firms set
output, but more sequentially.
Sophisticated firm moves first (‘leader’), and other firm reacts
(‘follower’).
Leader knows follower’s reaction function. Assume ‘A’ is leader and ‘B’
is follower.
Example (corresponds to handout)
max πA = p.qA - cA
qA
s.t. p = 50-q
q = qA + qB
and qB = 12.5 – qA / 4 (B’s reaction function)
2 4 qA
1
3
5
qB
A’s rf
B’s rf
Equilibrium


Sub constraints into objective function:
max πA = {50 – qA – [12.5 - qA ] } . qA – 2.qA
qA 4
i.e. max πA {37½ - ¾ qA} . qA – 2qA
qA
dπA = 37½ - 3/2 qA – 2 = 0
dqB
􀃖 qA
3 = 23⅔
􀃖 qB
5
= 6 7/12 (from B’s rf)
Illustrate the above equilibrium
Iso-profit lines for A: a line showing all positions of constraints for
firm A
a. Each iso-profit line has a maximum on the reaction function
b. A’s profits increase as we move down A’s reaction function
Numerical Example:
Π’s ↑
M qA
qB
iso-profit lines for A


Note: The Stackelberg equilibrium is an equilibrium i.e. position of rest
iii) Allocative Efficiency
For simplicity, suppose MC’s = ⌂
e.g. Cournot’s natural spring
Demand: p = 100-q
203/7
232/3
qA
A’s rf
qB
73/7

B’s rf
Stackelberg Equilibrium
Cournot Equilibrium
iso π
iso π
qA
A’s rf
qB
B’s rf


Perfect Competition
p = MC => q= 100
Monopoly
MR = MC => q = 50
Cournot Equilibrium
qA = 331/3, qB = 331/3
Therefore, q = 662/3
Inefficient, but not as inefficient as monopoly.
Stackelberg Equilibrium
Leader: qA = 50
Followers: qB = 25
q = 75
Inefficient, but more efficient than Cournot
iv) Bertrand Model
Like Cournot (simultaneous, zero CV’s), but view set price rather than
output.
Rule: firm setting lower price supplies all market.
Leads to cut-throat competition
Suppose: MCA = MCB and constant
p = 100-q
Cournot
66 Stackelberg 2/3
75
50 100
MR
Monopoly
Perfect
Competition
q
p
MCA = MCB D
q
p
A –
B –
A –
B –
A –


Firms under cut each other until price = MC
Equilibrium is where one firm produces at price = MC
- It is an oligopoly
- Looks like monopoly (only one firm produces)
- Produces same outcome as perfect competition (P=MC)
Note: Market structure is oligopoly, as if incumbent was to let P > MC
then other firms would enter.
v) Price Leadership
Like Stackelberg (sequential), except that the leader sets price rather
than output.
Leader may be dominant firm. E.g. has lower costs and could win ‘price
war’.
Suppose: MCL = 0 and MCF > 0 and linear leader sets price, and
follower is price-taker, so sets p = MCF, and leader knows this.
Construct leader demand curve:
DL = D – MCF. At each price leader calculates followers
reaction, and suppliers reaction of market to maximise profits.
Leader maximises profits where MRL = MCL
Note:
- qL + qF satisfies demand at this price
- it is an equilibrium
Overall there are many models of oligopoly. When it is appropriate will
depend on the nature of the industry we are seeking to analyse.
MCF
q
price
P
D MCL = 0
DL
MCL
qL qL


Lecture Handout Notes:


Topic 5.4: Collusive Oligopoly
The previous models of oligopoly are all examples of competitive
equilibrium.
Since oligopolies together produce more than the monopoly output, there is
an incentive to collude.
This is secret collusion and in many countries it is illegal!
The incentive to collude can be shown in the Cournot Model:
If restrict output and locate in the shaded area, then both firms are better off
(i.e. on higher iso-profit lines).
There are two main types of cartel:
i) Joint-profit maximisation
Firms behave as if a multi-plant monopolist
Industry profits are maximised when:
MR = MCA = MCB
Diagrammatically, sum MC curves horizontally:
A’s rf
B’s rf
πB
πA
Cournot Equilibrium
qA
qB
incentive to collude
£ £ £
qA
* qA qB
* qB q* qA+B
MCA
MCB
MCA+B
MR
p*
FIRM A FIRM B MARKET
D


By constructing qA
* + qB
* = q*
Note: low-cost firm produces more output.
If MCA > MCB, switch production from A to B until
MCA = MCB
Example: (on handout)
Cournot Model:
p = 50 – q
CA = 2 * qA
CB = q2
B
Conclusion:
MR = MCA = MCB
50-2q 2 2qB
=> qB
*
= 1
Also, 50 – 2q = 2
408 = 2q
24 = q
24 = qA + qB
Implies => qA
* = 23
Also, p = 50 – q
p = 26
We can illustrate this:
Note: When qA = 23 and qB = 1, then B is worse-off
‘cooperating’ (colluding). Thus, A must make ‘side-
A’s rf
B’s rf
qB
qA
Cournot Equilibrium
(qA = 202/7)
(qB = 73/7)
πB
πA
side payment
cooperative equilibrium


payments’ to B to make sure B participates – so both are
better off.
Note: Total output is smaller than when competing.
Problems with cartels are that there is an incentive to cheat on
agreements.
From this we see that in this case, both firms have an incentive
to expand outwards. This is an example of the well know
Prisoners’ Dilemma problem.
The Prisoners’ Dilemma:
- if stick to the agreement, then both better off
- but each has individual incentive to cheat
- if both cheat, both end up worse off
Hence, collusive agreements tend to be unstable equilibrium.
ii) Market-sharing Agreement
Firms agree a common price, and divide up market and behave
independently, consistent with price.
e.g. OPEC (oil) and de Beers (diamonds)
Let DA and DB be divisions of markets.
A’s rf
B’s rf
qB
qA
Cournot Equilibrium
(qA = 202/7)
(qB = 73/7)
πB
πA
output when collide


Common Price pC, such that pA ≤ pC ≤ pB
Firms produce qA* and qB*
Incentive to cheat: both firms are price-takers at pC
Low-cost firms have incentive to expand output 􀃆
iii) Stability of Cartels
Cartels are unstable equilibria.
In both cases, firms have the incentive to expand output.
Potentially, this is observable (even indirectly) as market price
falls.
It suggests cheating is detectable and hence punishable.
However, punishment must be credible, i.e. must be in the true
interest of the firm to carry out threat – often not the case.
In practice, oligopolists tend to compete in ways that do not
affect price:
Non-price competition
- advertising
- sales promotions
Secret-price competition
- off rebates
- set up subsidiary
- sell at higher quantity
There may also be external threats to a cartel from new
production.
e.g. North Sea Oil and OPEC
Russian Diamonds and de Beers
£
MRA DA
qA
MCA
qA*
pA
£
MRB DB
qB
MCB
qB*
pB
pC


Topic 6.1: Profit Maximisation
i. Why do firms exist?
Why not a collection of individuals undertaking production under
exchange?
Two reasons why:
1) Coase (1937)
Internalise transaction costs. Exchange is costly. Firms economise
on these costs through contracts
2) Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
Team-working. Higher output can be achieved from group
production
- diversion of labour
- problem: shirking
Traditional theory of the firm is owner-managed – leaders naturally
to profit maximisation
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, the owner-manager assumption was
questioned, and hence profit maximisation.
Non trivial => implications for firms behaviour
ii. Traditional Profit Maximisation Theory
In the modern context, a good example of the owner-manager
assumption is the one-person business or self-employed. Assume there
is no labour market, and leisure is given up. This will be according to
some production function.
One-man business maximises the economic rent (measured in
utility terms)
IC (indifference curve)
p* = c*
income
leisure
{
{
transfer
earnings
economic
rent
net
working IC
leisure labour
input
Slope is due to
diminishing MPL


In general the firms problem is:
Max π = R(Q,p) – C(Q,w,r)
= Revenue function – cost function
s.t. production function
π = π (Q) is known as the profit function. We use this in our analysis.
A prediction of this model is that profit takers do not affect the output
decision, Q*, and so do not distort firm behaviour.
(This is not the case for models considered below)
Lump-sum profit tax(T)
π = R – C – T
dπ = dR - dC - 0 = 0
dQ dQ dQ
􀃖 MR = MC
Same output solution for Q* as when T was 0.
C (Q,w,r)
R (Q, p)
Q
£ MR
MC
Q
£
break-even point π
From a liner demand
curve
(short run)
C
R
This shows the break
even point in the long run


Proportionate profits tax(T)
Levied on profits at a rate of t
π = (1-t)(R-C)
dπ = (1-t) (dR - dC) = 0
dQ dQ dQ
Again, the solution is unaffected by tax.
Z
Strong result of Traditional Theory: output is not affected by taxation.
Q*
£
0
Q
π
Q*
£
0
Q
π
π - T
T


iii. Agency Theory
Traditionally, firms raised their capital from bank loans (small firms still
do – overdraft). Modern corporations rely on equity from shares.
Why?
- Loans are risky for firms
- Repayments are fixed
- Banks may call in the loans
Loans are also risky for banks:
- Large loans are problematic (default)
- Bank managers risk averse.
With equity, vary dividend with performance, and spread the risk.
In return for accepting the risk, shareholders receive ownership rights,
i.e. there is a separation of ownership from management


Topic 6.2: Managerial Discretion Models
Separation of ownership from management gives rise to a principal-agent
problem.
Principal (shareholders) own assets, but must operate through agent
(manager), who has stewardship of the assets. It is only a problem if the
principal can not monitor/observe the actions of the agent due to asymmetric
information.
Two main models:
i. Sales-Revenue Maximisation
Associated with Baumol (1959) – see seminar sheet six.
Managers maximise the size of the firm, as it brings them personal
prestige, but subject to earning some return to keep shareholders
happy.
Two cases:
πC denotes the minimum profits required by shareholders (πR = profits
at QR)
i. πR ≥ πC:
􀃖 Profit constraint imposed by shareholders is non-binding
􀃖 Manager produces at QR
ii. πR < πC: 􀃖 Profit constraint binding 􀃖 Manager produces at QR1 Note: If symmetric information, then owner can set πC high enough to make sure output is Qπ TC TR πC Q Profit Function £ QR QR1 Qπ


Microeconomic Analysis Note: A profits tax now affects output where profit constraint is (or becomes) binding. ii. Expense Preference Model Associated with Williamson (1964) Managers maximise utility which includes scale of firm (S) and discretionary profit (D) after the shareholders have been satisfied. max u (S, D, perks,) s.t. π ≥ πC Where, D = π - πC In this model, profits have some value to the manager. Note: profits tax may affect output even when profit constraint is nonbinding. πC π tax £ D=0 QM Q IC (indifference curve) Manager πC π


Microeconomic Analysis Note: a proportionate tax gives rise to a stronger substitution effect towards S(≡Q), as D now relatively more expensive – and output may increase! iii. Criticisms Managerial models are still based on the neo-classical economics approach: - Managers are well informed - They optimise (i.e. maximise) Alternative models from management literature; based on satisfying behaviour. i.e. aim to “get by” or avoid bankruptcy Simon: argued that managers have bounded rationality Cyet and March: managers promote the interests of their own departments. £ D=0 QM Q IC Manager πC π IC Manager1 QM 1

Microeconomic Analysis Topic 7.1: Robinson-Crusoe Models All on handout:

Microeconomic Analysis

Microeconomic Analysis Topic 7.2: Robinson-Crusoe and Man Friday Economic Model 2 individuals x 1 good x 1 factor Now there is a possibility of trade We show: - producer and consumer decisions are separate (i.e. independent of each other) - trade allows all individuals to trade off their production constraints, so gains from trade (i.e. everybody is better off) Assume: - Robinson Crusoe owns the means of production, and Man Friday behaves passively to ensure an ‘equilibrium’ - We sketch equilibrium, so w and p are equilibrium prices Hence: RC = Robinson Crusoe MF = Man Friday Xs RC = Xd RC + Xd MF Ld RC = Ls RC + Ls MF a) Robinson Crusoe’s Problem Production: Robinson Crusoe chooses a labour demand and labour supply to maximise profits, as before in 7.1. Consumption: Consumption Opportunity Line (COL) is the same as before, but now Robinson Crusoe no longer has to consume at P, as he can hire labour from Man Friday X = f (L) Highest iso-profit line in production PRC L X ICRC CRC Ld RC Xs RC π* p Xd RC Xd MF Ls RC Ls MF

Microeconomic Analysis Here, given the preferences of ICRC, then: - Robison Crusoe hires labour Ls MF which reduces his consumption by Xd MF - By construction: P . Xd MF = w . Ls MF loss of income to Robison Crusoe=factor payment to Man Friday b) Man Friday’s Problem Man Friday does not produce, just consumes. Conclusion: - Production and consumption is separate for both agents (i.e. decisions over P is independent of that over C) - Both agents better off trading. Illustrates the gains of trade COL (slope = w/p) L X CRC Ls MF Xd MF


Microeconomic Analysis Topic 7.3: Several Outputs Two goods, x and y, and two factors, L and K. Resources are scarce, L = , K = , they can be allocated to x and y: Lx + Ly = Kx + Ky = The production functions: x = fx (Lx, Kx) y = fy (Ly, Ky) i. Efficiency The fundamental economic constraints can be shown diagrammatically in the Edgeworth-Bowley box Any position in the box shows the amount of L and K going to x and y. Consider position R, then it produces xR of x, and yR of y. Note: R is inefficient. We can produce more x and y at S Note: S is also inefficient! Points of efficiency occur where the isoquants are tangential to one another. i.e. point T. 0x Lx R Kx R Ly R Ky R 0y R S T XR YR Ky Kx Lx Ly L K contract curve


Microeconomic Analysis The tangency at T is not unique. The locus of all tangencies (i.e. efficient points) is called the contract curve. The efficiency condition in production is: MRTSx KL = MRTSy KL ii. Production Possibility Curves Re-drawing the contract curve in the goods plane gives the production possibility frontier. The production possibility frontier (PPF) shows the maximum x and y we get given and . Outwards shifts could occur if more and is found (e.g. North Sea Oil), or if there is an improvement in technology. If both production functions are linearly homogenous (i.e. LRS – constant returns of scale), the production possibility frontier is strictly concave, i.e. production possibility curve. The slope of the production possibility curve is called the marginal rate of transformation of y for x (MRTyx) X Y +1 MRT ppc T S R feasible region 0X 0Y X Y production possibility frontier

Microeconomic Analysis MRTyx is related to the marginal cost of x and y as follows: MRTyx = - MCx MCy


Microeconomic Analysis Topic 7.4: International Trade Now uses a 2 x 2 x 2 model. 2 factors: L and K (capital and labour) 2 outputs: x and y 2 agents (countries): A and B Assume: a) Production technologies are linearly homogenous b) Trade is costless c) Factors do not migrate We can examine trade by allowing any of the following to vary (each will produce a competitive advantage): - Factor Endowments - Production Technologies - Tastes Below, we will focus on the changes in factor endowments only – i.e. the other two will remain constant. Suppose x is relatively labour intensive. i. Differences in Endowments A has more K and less L – x is more labour (L) intensive. No Trade: 0yA 0yB LA LB KB KB L K 0xA 0xB Contract curve in A y x PPCA PPCB


Microeconomic Analysis Note: tastes are the same In absence of trade, the countries must produce and consume at respective production possibility curves, at PA/CA and at PB/PB. Note: At PA and PB: MRTA yx > MRTB

yx (ignores signs)
This means that A has to give up more y to produce another unit of x,
than does B.
Hence, B has comparative advantage in the production of x. This is the
basis for trade. Conversely A has a comparative advantage in y.
Trade:
A must agree terms of trade, i.e. prices px and py at which exchange
goods, such that:
MRTA
yx ≥ px/py ≥ MRTB
yx
At these prices, countries produce to maximise their endowments and
then consume to maximise
their utility.
The countries specialise in
producing the good in which
they have a comparative
advantage (B in x, and A in
y), and then diversify in
consumption.
Both countries gain from
trade.
y
x
PA=CA
PPCA
PB=CB
PPCB
CA’
y
x
PPCA
PA’
PA
PB
PB’
PPCB
CB’


Heckscher-Ohlin Result
Each country specialises in the good which uses most intensively the local
abundant factor.
i.e. B has more L
x is L-intensive
=> B specialises in x
ii. Factor Mobility
We assumed factors are immobile
Result
Given that x is labour(L)-intensive and is constant in returns of scale, it
can shown that as w/r ↑ then the MCx increases to MCy
Pre-Trade:
MRTA
yx > MRTB
yx
implies => (MCx/MCy)A > (MCx/MCy)B
=> (w/r)A > (w/r)B
If factors are mobile, then labour migrates B 􀃆 A and capital flows, A 􀃆 B
This alters dimensions of production possibility curves until ppcA ≡ ppcB,
so that the comparative advantage is eliminated.
Result:
Whether we observe flows of
goods or flows of factors will
depend on the relative speeds
of adjustment in these markets.
Openness of markets:
- Barriers to trade
- Barriers to migration/ capital
flows
LA LB
KB
KA


Topic 8.0: General Equilibrium Theory
General Equilibrium Theory attempts to provide a complete description of
decentralised market economy.
Based only on assumptions about the optimised behaviour of microeconomic
agents (producers/consumers).
The General Equilibrium Theory attempts to find prices at which all markets
clear. (i.e. equilibrium)
Circular Flow of Income:
Prices at which D=S in every market.
Dates back to Walras(1870’s), revived by Hicks(1930’s) and developed
by Arrow and Debreu(1960’s)
Producers Consumers
D
S D
S
Factors
Goods


Topic 8.1: Model Set-Up
Many severe assumptions, which lead many to question reality of model:
a. No monopoly (no price setting)
b. No uncertainty (prices known)
c. No externalities (prices exist)
d. No public goods (prices exist)
e. No increase in returns of scale (leads to monopoly)
f. No government (no price distortions-taxes etc.)
Here, we focus on the 2x2x2 model, so there are four markets: x,y,L,K
Definition: excess demand function for good x is:
Zx = xA
* + xB
* - x*
Since, all markets are related, then:
Zx = Zx(px,py,w,r)
Ultimately, excess depends on al the prices in the economy. Likewise:
Zy = Zy(py,px,w,r)
ZL = ZL(w,r,px,py)
ZK= ZK(r,w,px,py)
Walrasian Equilibrium
Set of prices for, px, py, w and r, such that Zx=0, Zy=0, ZL=0, and ZK=0.
This is a general equilibrium.
When prices are determined by markets, it is known as a competitive
general equilibrium.


Topic 8.2: Conditions for a Competitive Equilibrium
i. Partial Equilibrium
a) Exchange Economy
Suppose production has already taken place, producing of x
and of y.
A and B own all the factors, and have claims on the total output.
Suppose, A gets A and A, and B gets B and B (where A and
B = , and A + B = ).
These are known as A and B’s initial endowments (before
exchange/trade).
(a) The Offer Curve
Consider A.
xA*, yA
* are A’s demand for x and y
Consider another set pf prices (where px↑ and/or py↓)
=> another set of demands
The offer curve is locus of all optimal positions as prices
change. Likewise, we can find an offer curve for B.
Producers Consumers
Factors
Goods
Consumption
Opportunity
Line (COL)
slope = - px
py
COL’
yA
*
yA
yA
xA
xA
* XA
ICA
ICA’
A’s initial
endowment (IE)


(b) Edgeworth-Bowey Consumption Box
At these prices there is disequilibrium.
Excess supply of x: Zx=xA
* + xB
* - < 0 Excess demand of y: Zy=yA * + yB * - > 0
By the law of demand and supply:
Zx < 0 􀃎 py↓ Zy > 0 􀃎 py↑
This occurs where the offer curves intersect:
A’s offer curve
COL’
COL
B’s offer curve
ICA
ICB
y
x
0B
0A
xA
yA A’s offer curve
B’s offer curve
COL
COL slope
= (-px/py)
xB xB
*
xA
*
yB
xB
yA
xA
yB
IE
ICA
ICB


ii. Production Economy
Now examine equilibrium in factor markets and ignore exchange
economy
Scare factors, and .
In order to maximise profits, it is necessary to hire factors to minimise
costs, i.e. MRTSKL = - w/r
250
Equilibrium at e:
ZL = Lx
* + Ly
* - = 0
ZK = Kx
* + Ky
* - = 0
Condition for equilibrium in production:
MRTSx
KL = MRTSy
KL = - w/r
iii. Product Mix
For general equilibrium the exchange and production economies must
be in equilibrium together.
- prices, px and py at which consumers maximise utility, must
be the same prices at which producer maximises profits.
- Prices, w and r, at which producers minimise costs must be
consistent with IE position.
Condition for profit maximisation (π-max):
0x
Lx
*
Kx
*
Ly
*
Ky
*
0y
e
y
x
L
K
contract curve


At P: MRTyx = - px
py
Condition for Utility Maximisation:
MRSA
yx = - px = MRSB
yx
py
Top level condition for general equilibrium is:
MRSA
yx = MRSB
yx = MRTyx = - px
py
This ensures both sides of economy are in equilibrium.
Aside: This condition is usually written another way: Community
Indifference Curve (CIC). It shows the bundles of goods x
and y that can give consistent levels of utility to each
individual, A and B.
P
slope: - px
py
x
y
p.p.c


Notes:
1. Community Indifference Curve’s useful analytical device
2. Not the same as social welfare function
3. Community Indifference Curve’s can cross
The slope of Community Indifference Curve is determined by MRScom
yx.
Along a Community Indifference Curve: MRScom
yx = MRSA
yx = MRSB
yx.
Hence, we write top-level condition as:
MRScom
yx = MRTyx = - px
py
x
y
ICA
UA = UA
x
y
ICB
UB = UB
y
x
ICA
CIC


L
0x
0y
y*
x*
K
e
(2)
0y
(3)
y
x
y*
0x
x*
e (1)
UA
IE
UB
- py
px
CIC


Topic 9.0: Welfare Economics
Statements about welfare of society from different allocations of
goods/services.
Example:
2 individuals, and =10
(i) (ii) (iii)
A 7 5 0
B 3 5 10
Is society better off under (i), (ii), or (iii)?
Two problems:
a) Inter-Personal Utility Comparisons
- Utility is measured ordinally, so can not compare utility changes
across individuals
b) Ethical Judgements
- Even if can measure utility cardinally, still a problem of how to treat
individuals,
- Suppose, A = a millionaire and B = a beggar
Lead us to make value judgements
- These are statements which can’t be verified/falsified by reference
to the facts
Normative Economics
Contrast to positive economics (topics 1-8).
In making value judgements trade-off:
- analytically useful
- reasonable
Example:
A is a dictator (i.e. only A’s preferences count)
Then (i) preferred (ii) preferred (iii)
Very useful but highly unreasonable.


Topic 9.1: The Pareto Criteria
Most widely used value judgements in Economics
- Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923)
Pareto Postulates
1) Social Welfare function is of the form:
W = W (u1, u2…,un)
*Individual Approach*
2) Individuals are best judge of their well-being, ui
*Liberal Approach*
3) Social welfare, w, improves if at least one person is better off and noone
is any worse off.
*The Pareto Criterion*
Pareto Improvement (in welfare) us when 3 occurs. An allocation from which
no Pareto improvement is possible is Pareto Optimal/Efficient
It is in this same sense that efficiency is used in economics
Example: The Consumption Box
R is not Pareto Optimal, as R 􀃆 S is a Pareto Improvement.
T is Pareto Optimal (can not make A better off without making B worse off)
Overall, only allocations on contract curve are Pareto Optimal.
x
y
0B
0A
R
S
T
A’s IC
B’s IC
Contract Curve


Topic 9.2: Welfare Maximisation
2 individuals, A and B
i. Objective Functions
Social Welfare Function
W = W(UA, UB)
Iso-welfare line: line of constant welfare (W)
According to Pareto they look like:
ii. Constraint
Utility Possibility Frontier (u.p.f) – maximum utilities for A and B given
societies constraints:
- factor endowments
- production technology
- utility functions
Each output-mix on the production possibility curve has a utility
possibility curve associate with it (maximum utility’s given the output
mix).
y
x
0B’
0B
0A
0A’
Contract Curve
UB
0B’ 0B UA
0A’
0A
Utility Possibility
Curve (u.p.c)
UB
UA
W
ΔW < 0 ΔW > 0
“Squiggles” as utility is
measured ordinally


Utility possibility frontier is outer boundary of all utility possibility
curves.
iii. Welfare Optimum
Occurs where iso-welfare line is tangential to the utility possibility
frontier.
Note:
a) W* is on the same utility production curve which implies the same
position on the production possibility curve – implies some
‘configuration’ in the economy.
b) Utility production frontier gives the set of all Pareto Optimum
positions. The welfare optimum selects from these.
c) Formally, tangency condition:
- dw/duA
= - duB/dx = duB/dy
dw/duB
duA/dx duA/dy
Rearranging, dw . duA = dw . duB
duA
dx duB dx
This says, at margin, the increase in welfare from an extra unit of x
to A, is the same as giving it to B (same for y also).
upc upf
welfare optimum (W*)
W
UB
UA
Utility possibility frontier runs
along outside of all utility
possibility curves
( )


d) The tangency condition is necessary for a welfare optimum, but not
sufficient.
upf
W
W
w*
w**
UA
UB
w** = welfare optimum
􀃆 necessary = w**
not sufficient = w*


Topic 9.3: Welfare Properties of General Equilibrium
In General Equilibrium Theory, each agent optimises (‘firms’ and consumers),
but does society?
i.e. does the General Equilibrium Theory maximise social welfare?
- First Theorem of Welfare Economics:
A competitive General Equilibrium is Pareto Optimality.
i.e. General Equilibrium puts us on the utility production frontier
i.e. General Equilibrium is efficient
Informal Proof
Focusing on the 2x2x2 model:
Exchange
Condition: MRSA
yx = MRSB
yx
General Equilibrium generates this condition, as it is a set of prices, such
that: - px/py = MRSA
yx = MRSB
x
Likewise, for the production economy, and for the product mix economy.
- Second Theorem of Welfare Economics
Any Pareto Optimum position can be represented as a competitive general
equilibrium provided there is some suitable distribution of income.
This says we can get to any position on the utility production frontier,
including w*
Informal Proof
Again, focusing on the 2x2x2 model:
Exchange
OA
OB y
x
contract curve


Problem:
- at the initial endowment (IE), the equilibrium gives w’ on utility
production frontier, which is not welfare optimum.
- we can not get to w* from IE using markets.
- by moving from IE 􀃆 IE’ we can get to w*
Conclusions
Sufficient conditions for the General Equilibrium to generate welfare
optimum are:
a) 3 conditions for General Equilibrium
( 􀃎 Pareto Optimum by first theorem)
b) Fourth optimality condition
( 􀃎 by second theorem)
- dw/duA = duB/dx
dw/duB
duA/dx
gets us to w*
IE IE’
w*
w'
uA
uB
u uA B
x
y 0B
0A
uB
uA
w'
w* w
upc(=upf)


Topic 9.4: Criticisms of the Pareto Postulates
Will be covered in more detail in seminar 8.
1) w=w(u1,…un)
2) Individual is best judge of utility
3) Pareto Improvement
i) Individualistic/Liberal
Will be discussed in seminars
ii) Inter-personal utility comparisons
Frequently observe both gainers and losers but Pareto cannot say if
welfare has been imprived.
Example 1: Break up a monopoly. Consumers better off and
monopolists worse off.
Example 2: New bridge replacing ferry – gainers and losers
Common Principle
If gainers can in principle compensate the losers, and still be better-off,
then welfare has improved.
Note: Compensation is not actually paid! Hence, also know as
Potential Pareto Improvement (i.e. potential for Pareto Improvement).
Sometimes know as the Kaldor-Hicks criterion
P􀃆Q: B gains, A loses. Is society better off?
Consider B paying compensation to A
Q
P’
P utility possibility
curve
UA
UB


This moves us up along the utility production curve (up the contract
curve) until we get to P’.
Hence, Q is the Potential Pareto Improvement on P because P’ is the
Pareto Improvement on P
􀃆 So society is better off at Q than P
Problem
Compensation principle only considers
distributed issues (movements along
utility production curve). It ignores
changes in configuration of economy (i.e.
the fact that P and Q represent different
positions on the production possibility
curve).
This leads to the Scitovsky Paradox.
Q Potential Pareto Improvement
on P because P’ is the Pareto
Improvement on P.
Suppose make the move from
P􀃆Q.
Paradox is that P might be a
Potential Pareto Improvement
of Q!
P Potential Pareto Improvement
on Q because Q’ is the Pareto
Improvement of Q
Suggests unlimited improvements in welfare are possible.
Q
P’
y
x
0A
0B
contract curve
Q
P
x
y
Q Q’
P
P’
upc
uB
uA
upc


iii) Ethical Consideration
Pareto treats all individuals the same
Problem
If A is a millionaire and B is a beggar, then according to Pareto,
welfare is improved if ΔUA↑ but ΔUB=0
Alternative Welfare Systems
a) Rawls
Place individuals behind ‘veil of ignorance’, such that they do not
know what member of society they were.
w(u1,u2,…,un) = min{ u1,u2,…,un}
i.e. maximum strategy
b) Egalitarianism
Welfare improves if utilities more equal
c) Utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham
“maximise greatest good of the greatest number”
Interpreted as: w = uA + uB, assumes utility is cardinally measured
(will be discussed in further details in seminars)
Line of equality
UA
UB
45degrees
W


Index
A
Alchian and Demsetz................. 62
Allocative Efficiency..............47, 54
Arrow and Debreu .................... 79
average cost............................. 29
Axiom of Greed............ 2, 3, 17, 18
B
Bertrand .................................. 55
C
Cartels ..................................... 61
Coase ...................................... 62
Cobb-Douglas........................... 30
collude See collusion, See collusion,
See collusion
collusion .................................. 58
Completeness............................. 2
consumer preferences ................. 1
Consumer Surplus..................... 20
Continuity .................................. 3
contract curve ............... 74, 90, 97
Cournot ....... 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 59
D
Differentiability ........................... 6
Duopoly ................................... 51
E
Economies of Scale ................... 29
Edgeworth-Bowey..................... 82
Edgeworth-Bowley box.............. 73
Efficiency ................................. 73
Egalitarianism........................... 98
Elasticises ................................ 11
Elasticity, Demand .................... 16
Elasticity, Income ..................... 12
Elasticity, Own-Price.................. 15
Elasticy, Cross-Price .................. 15
Elasticy, Income ....................... 15
Endowment.............................. 76
Equi-Marginal Returns ................. 7
Euler’s Theorem...................32, 34
Exchange Economy................... 81
Expected Utility Theorem........... 40
G
General Equilibrium Theory .. 79, 94
H
Heckscher-Ohlin Result ..............78
Hicks..............79, See Kaldor-Hicks
Hicksian ............ 13, 14, 18, 21, 22
homogeneous ................30, 32, 34
Hurwicz....................................36
I
Indifference Curves .....................1
Indifference Set ......................1, 3
interdependence ................. 51, 52
iso-cost .............................. 27, 28
isoquant ............ 25, 26, 28, 30, 31
J
Jeremy Bentham.......................98
K
Kaldor .................See Kaldor-Hicks
Kaldor-Hicks .............................96
L
Lagrange....................................7
Lagrangian ........................... 7, 16
Laspeyres.................................19
Lener .......................................47
lexicographic preferences.............6
Linear Programming Approach ...24
M
Man Friday ......................... 71, 72
Marginal Revenue .....................46
marginal utility...................... 7, 16
Marshallian ........ 11, 12, 15, 16, 22
Monopoly ........................... 46, 55
monotonicity...............................2
N
Nash Equilibrium .......................52
Neoclassical Consumer Theory .....1
O
Offer Curve...............................81


Oligopoly.............................51, 58
Optimisation............................... 7
Optimist ................................... 36
P
Paasche ................................... 19
Pareto Criteria .......................... 90
Pareto Improvement ...... 90, 96, 97
Pareto Optimal ......................... 90
Pareto Postulates.................90, 96
Perfect Competition .................. 55
Pessimist.................................. 36
Potential Pareto Improvement ... 96
Preference Relation..................... 1
Price Discrimination.. 47, 48, 49, 50
Price Leadership ....................... 56
Prisoners’ Dilemma ................... 60
Product Mix .............................. 84
Production Economy ................. 84
Production Possibility Curve ....... 74
Profit Maximisation ................... 62
R
Reflexivity .................................. 2
Restrictions .......................... 2, 17
Revealed Preference Theory ...... 17
Risk Aversion............................ 42
Robinson-Crusoe .................69, 71
S
Sales-Revenue Maximisation ......66
Scitovsky Paradox .....................97
Sets ...........................................8
Slutsky ............................... 14, 18
St Petersberg Paradox ...............38
Stackelberg ............. 52, 54, 55, 56
Strategic Uncertainty .................51
substitution effect ..........14, 18, 68
T
Theory of the Industry...............45
Transitivity .................................2
U
uncertainty ........... 35, 40, 51, 80
Uniqueness Theorem.................10
Utilitarianism.............................98
Utility Change ...........................22
Utility Curve..............................20
Utility Function.................. 5, 6, 40
Utility Maximisation ...................85
W
Walras .....................................79
Walrasian .................................80
Weak Axiom of Revealed
Preference.............................18
weak preference ordering .. 2, 6, 40
Welfare Economics .............. 89, 94

WHAT CRITICAL LESSONS CAN BE DERIVED FROM THE JAPANESE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF THE 1990’s?

Introduction

History is replete with examples of financial crisis; they appear to be an intrinsic feature of market-oriented credit and financial systems. In recent years, the march of globalisation and concomitant increases in capital and trade flows has led to increased volatility in international financial markets, and as a result, financial crises have become increasingly common across the globe. While each financial crisis is no doubt distinct, they also share striking similarities with one another, and an examination of the longer historical record finds stunning quantitative and qualitative parallels. This begs the question; can previous recessions provide us with lessons on how to handle the current financial crisis?

The current financial crisis is the first major financial crisis of the 21st Century, and it has developed rapidly, becoming increasingly virulent, causing widespread disruption to both industrial and emerging economies across the globe. Nevertheless, it follows a well-trodden path laid down by centuries of financial folly, and to understand this crisis and determine optimal policy responses, many analysts have compared the current turmoil to the collapse of Japan’s bubble economy in the early 1990s and the need to prevent the kind of prolonged slump that hit Japan.

Similar to the current global financial crisis, Japan’s ‘lost decade’ began with stock market and real estate bubbles. At the beginning of the 1990s these speculative asset bubbles began to burst, first with a reduction in the Nikkei Stock Index, followed in early 1992 by a fall in land prices (Amyx, 2004). From its 1989 peak of 38,916, the Nikkei Stock Index average fell by 63% during the 1990s (McCurry, 2008). Similarly, land prices slumped; commercial land values fell by roughly 80% in a decade, a far cry from the days when the grounds of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo were rumoured to be worth more than all the real estate in California (McCurry, 2008). Both companies and individuals were rendered unable to repay loans secured by these assets, leaving the nation’s banks with an enormous burden of non-performing loans, triggering a banking crisis (Amyx, 2004). The result was more than a decade of low growth, deflation, and output persistently below potential.

The Japanese economic model had gone horribly wrong, and recovery failed to materialize. At first, the Japanese Government’s strategy was forbearance, more than six years passed from the onset of severe financial distress before the Government initiated aggressive measures to tackle the bad debt problem and instigate fundamental financial reforms (Amyx, 2004). In 1996, following the bankruptcy of several specialised housing loan companies, known as jusen, the Government made its first capital injection to purchase assets from ailing lenders (Nanto, 2008). In total the Japanese Government pumped $495 billion (¥60 trillion yen), or 12% of GDP, under five different bailout packages, into the banking sector (Nanto, 2008). The motive behind the Government’s capital injections was that if it could keep banks and lenders operating their profits from operations and capital gains from equity holdings could fund the write-offs of bad loans (McCurry, 2008). However, the bailout packages came at a cost. Free to lend again, banks simply used funds to keep countless ‘zombie’ companies afloat. Between 1995 and 2003, Japan’s banks wrote off a cumulative total of $318 billion (¥37.2 trillion) in non-performing loans, but new ones appeared so fast that the total outstanding amount kept increasing and peaked in March 2002 at $330 billion (¥43.2 trillion) or 8.4% of total lending (Nanto, 2008). The Bank of Japan was similarly unresponsive to begin with, waiting seventeen months before cutting interest rates, and did not bring it down to 0% until 2001 (McCurry, 2008). Nevertheless, interest rates were eventually slashed, and remained at 0% for almost six years (Fackler, 2008).

Overcoming the crisis in Japan took a combination of capital injections, new laws and regulations, quantitative-easing, stronger oversight, a reorganization of the banking sector, and a constantly low interest rate. The process took more than a decade and full recovery, given the current economic environment, remains elusive. The Nikkei Stock Index is still 70% off its 1989 peak, and property prices are at roughly 40% of their 1990 values (McCurry, 2008). However, one of the silver linings of adversity is that it teaches us valuable lessons, so what lessons does Japan’s experience offer for the rest of the world?

Literature Review

Overview
This report reviews the major actions of the Japanese Government in dealing with its crisis, highlighting some of the lessons learned from their experience. It will then proceed to determine whether these lessons are being applied today, assessing if there is any evidence of an improved response. To tackle this core thesis, it is necessary to examine the literature related to five distinct aspects of the Japanese financial crisis. This review will begin with literature detailing the circumstances and effects of the Japanese financial crisis and then progress to analyse the approaches and tools employed by regulators in response to the crisis. Section III will then draw on literature examining the key lessons distilled from the Japanese financial crisis. Subsequently, the paper will examine whether these lessons are applicable to different financial crises. Finally, section V will assess whether any of the lessons obtained from Japan’s experience are being employed in response to the current financial predicament, concentrating on the responses of the US and UK.

I.I Literature on the circumstances and effects of the Japanese financial crisis

The first step in assessing the responses to the Japanese crisis is understanding the nature of the meltdown and its root causes. There is a high degree of consensus on the nature of the crisis; the collapse of the bubble economy of the 1980’s and the fall of real estate prices. There are many examples of literature detailing these issues. For example Vogel (2006), Cooper (2001), Amyx (2004), Nakaso (2001) and Nanto (2008) focus on these twin aspects and the implications held for the Japanese economy. Nanto is particularly informative, producing a comprehensive portrait of the pre-crisis bubble period and the effect of the ‘burst’ on the financial sector. Cooper expands upon this issue, providing a broader overview of the effects of the crisis, incorporating GDP growth rate, employment, living standards, and foreign trade balances. He highlights that the crisis severely crippled the Japanese economy, bringing their growth rate below that of any OECD country. Moreover, there is a wealth of insightful commentary into the nature of the crisis from Japanese and international press coverage focusing on the core effects.

However, there is more disagreement amongst analysts regarding the underlying causes of these economic problems. Most serious analysts acknowledge that Japan’s economic problems were caused by both macroeconomic policy failures and structural inefficiencies, but they differ in the relative weight they ascribe the two factors. One school of thought argues that Japan’s macroeconomic policies played a more important role. Posen (2004) argues that the burst in the bubble was caused by inappropriate concretionary fiscal and monetary policies in the late 1980’s. He further argues that when the Government introduced fiscal stimulus to boost demand, it was too little too late. Similarly Krugman (1999) supports this school of thought, but emphasises the role of monetary policy. He argues that the Japanese economy entered a liquidity trap; at very low interest rates individuals will hold all additions to the supply of money, thus rendering monetary policy ineffective.
Another group of analysts argue that structural rigidities within the Japanese economy were more important than these macroeconomic policy failures. These economists view the bubble economy as a symptom of underlying structural problems rather than a cause of the prolonged stagnation (Vogel, 2006). One such economist, Richard Katz (1998), argues that Japanese economic problems are rooted in its ‘dual economy’. He asserts that the pre crisis Japanese economy could be regarded as two separate entities; one was highly efficient and competitive whilst the other was inefficient and survived because of protective government regulations. According to Katz, the Japanese economy was able to thrive up until the 1990s because the competitive part of the dual economy propped up the non-competitive segment. He uses the example of car manufacturers, who would buy glass, steel and other components from domestic manufacturers at higher prices than more efficient foreign suppliers. Katz suggests that over time the Government shifted its emphasis from the competitive to the protected sector and with the sharp appreciation of the yen in the 1980s, the efficient sectors could no longer bankroll the system without losing their competitive edge. Masahiko Aoki (2000) puts this point slightly differently, contending that Japan’s fundamental dilemma was that competitive sectors naturally drifted away from the Government’s industrial policy framework while less competitive sectors relied increasingly heavily on government support.

Vogel (2006) stresses a different type of structural problem, a chronic excess of savings due to an inadequate social safety net and the lack of a comprehensive retirement program. This high level of saving fuelled investment, but also implied suppressed consumption. The Japanese economy was left with a stubborn investment savings gap and could not shift from investment driven to consumption driven growth (Vogel, 2006). Scheade (1996) puts forward a different argument, suggesting that the crisis was more the result of the inappropriate design of the regulatory system. His argument is based around the premise that the Japanese financial system and its regulatory structure did not evolve after the post-war period of rapid growth, 1950 - 1973. He states that the system was characterized by collusive regulation, referred to as dango gyose, and administrative guidance, resulting in an entanglement of regulators and regulates and consequently neither party were interested in disclosure or rule enforcement, as well as the high degree of fraud (Scheade, 1996).
This debate identifies a central piece of the story, it is clear that both policy failures and structural inefficiencies were to blame for the economic malaise. Therefore in assessing Japan’s responses to the economic problems it is important to consider both issues.

I.II Literature examining and analysing the responses of Japanese authorities

There is a vast array of sources detailing the Japanese Government’s financial reforms and recovery efforts. Cooper (2001) has produced a comprehensive report examining the core aspects of the Government’s response; fiscal measures, monetary policy, banking reform and other structural changes. Further sources build upon this level of detail and analyse a specific area of the Government’s approach. Nanto (2008), for instance, focuses on the five bailout packages and other sources of fiscal stimulus. Similarly, Nakaso (2001) provides an exceptionally detailed overview of the nature of the banking reform up to March 2000, utilising his prior position as a manager of the Bank of Japan.

Analysis of the tools employed by the Japanese regulators is typically critical. Most commentators agree that intervention took far too long to materialise. Amyx (2004) highlights this issue, stating that the Government’s delayed response translated into lost output and enormous fiscal outlays. Similarly, Vogel (2006) supports this view, stressing that the Bank of Japan moved too slowly and too gradually to lower interest rates. He also notes that when they eventually did lower interest rates to zero, they still remained bound by their post war fixation with combating inflation. Hwang and Schaefer (2002) examine the factors impeding the implementation of policies to address Japan's economic problems and attempt to answer why intervention was so late. They highlight factors such as bureaucratic intransigence, lack of political will, powerful interest groups with much to lose under reform, and the relatively minor impact of the crisis on the daily lives of the average Japanese citizen.

Likewise, many analysts regard the Government’s financial reforms and recovery efforts, once implemented, as ineffective. A number of authors attribute much of the economy’s disappointing performance to “exceptionally poor monetary policymaking” (Bernanke, 2000, p. 150). Additionally, Kuttner and Posen (2002) find that Japanese fiscal policy was contractionary over much of the 1990s, and attribute part of the protracted downturn to insufficient fiscal stimulus. Moreover, Amyx’s (2004) statistically based analysis asserts that policy remedies were unsuccessful. Kobayashi (2009) supports this contention with his conclusion that the fiscal stimulus packages proved ineffective because the Government did not pursue a serious policy effort to make banks dispose of their non-performing loans. Furthermore, Katz (2003) supports this line of thought with his argument that certain reforms, such as aggressive tax reforms, only exacerbated Japan’s economic woes because they reduced households’ capacity to consume.

The combination of timid monetary policy and counterproductive fiscal policy resulted in a macroeconomic strategy that failed to restore aggregate demand, defeat deflation, and return the Japanese economy to growth (Sheard, 2008). An examination of the Japanese Government’s responses therefore suggests that the crisis could have been handled better. Thus, it ensues that lessons can be derived on how to better tackle a crisis of this nature.

I.III Literature examining the key lessons derived from Japan’s experience

The context of the current financial climate has led many economists to examine what lessons can be derived from Japan’s policy failures. As Blanchard notes “this may not be a bad time to assess the lessons from the Japanese full experiment” (Blanchard, 2000, p. 185).
Drawing on the findings of many analysts, one of the clearest lessons emerging from studies of Japan’s banking crisis is that action should have been swifter. The delayed response by Japanese authorities to the bad debt problem only exacerbated the issue and escalated the costs of recovery, a mistake that should serve as a key lesson for the current crisis (Amyx, 2004). Sheard (2008) supports this view, asserting that the Japanese Government acted far too slowly and timidly on all accounts. One way in which he illustrates this view is with the example that it was not until 1998 that the deposit guarantee was funded and an institutional infrastructure was implemented to deal with the troubled assets (Sheard, 2008).
Japan’s five bank bailout packages also hold some lessons for today’s global policymakers. Hoshi (2008) identifies one such lesson, asserting that recapitalization attempts were nowhere near large enough to solve the capital shortage problems of Japanese banks in the long run. By 2005 cumulative losses totalled over ¥96 trillion, roughly 19% of GDP, clearly dwarfing the amount injected by Japanese authorities (Hoshi, 2008). He concludes this point with the view that Japan’s experience suggests that small and repeated capital injections are, at best, only temporary fixes. Kobayashi (2008a) also highlights a similar lesson related to Japan’s capital injections. He suggests that capital injections are unlikely to succeed in eradicating payment uncertainty, but if fiscal stimulus is to work then stringent asset evaluation is necessary. Moreover, Nanto (2008) documents that when Japan announced its first financial bailout package, it placed stringent conditions on the assistance that banks were unwilling to accept. The net result was that the banks ignored the package and tried to bolster their balance sheets by not lending.
Further lessons can be derived from Japan’s recapitalization policies. Hoshi (2008), for instance identifies that Governments attempting to implement their own recapitalization policies must conduct due diligence on the financial institutions receiving public funds. In Japan, many small but important regional banks were recapitalized, only to eventually fail (Hoshi, 2008). Additionally, banks that receive public funds should not be forced to lend to small and medium sized firms. As the goal of recapitalization is to enable banks to continue to extend credit, the Japanese Government opted to require banks to lend to small and medium sized firms, but this policy kept credit open to many insolvent ‘zombie’ firms (Hoshi, 2008). Hoshi concludes that both these mistakes contributed to Japan’s subsequent decade of economic malaise.

Regarding monetary policy, Kobayashi (2008b) makes the point that it should not be heralded as a perfect solution in an insolvency crisis. In this respect he adopts a similar view to that of Nobel laureate, Professor Lucas, who remarks that “monetary policy should concentrate on the one thing it can do well; control inflation. It can be hard to keep this in mind in financially chaotic times, but I think it is worth a try” (Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2007). This view is further supported by Daniel Leigh in his IMF paper (2009). Other scholars, however, draw less sceptical lessons from Japan’s monetary policies. Sheard (2008), Woodford (2008), and Posen (2009) argue that quantitative-easing was an effective strategy for addressing deflation, despite the policy’s shortcomings. As Woodford points out, a lesson to be absorbed is that central banks should signal that they are expanding the balance sheet consistent with their calculation of how much money should be in the economy after re-flation is successful (Woodford, 2008).

Furthermore, there are a number of additional lessons to be taken from Japan’s experiences. Kobayashi (2008a), for instance, highlights that debt restructuring is absolutely necessary to prevent a vicious cycle and that public asset management companies may need to be established to prevent debt deflation. Similarly, Kanaya and Woo (2000) document that Japanese regulatory authorities needed to take a proactive attitude towards supervision, and that transparent accounting standards could have been an effective tool to do so. Moreover they recognize that uncoordinated deregulation can be harmful, and that the sequence of deregulation is also important. They support this view by highlighting that Japanese banks were not allowed to underwrite securities whilst the bond market was being liberalized, it was not until 1994 when banks were allowed to set up security subsidiaries, and this weakened banks (Kanaya and Woo, 2000).

It is therefore apparent that a number of potentially relevant lessons can be derived from Japan’s experience. Having critically analysed the literature, these core lessons are: action should be taken early (Amyx, 2004), policymakers must be flexible and willing to employ a broad range of measures to stabilize the financial system, including aggressive fiscal and monetary stimulus (Kang and Syed, 2009). Moreover, policy responses should be coordinated and attack the underlying problem of bad debt (Kobayashi, 2009), and finally, an exit strategy from the rescue policies must be carefully planned and implemented when signs of recovery emerge (Sheard, 2008).

I.IV Literature examining the applicability of these key lessons

It is not clear at this stage whether the lessons identified are applicable to the current, or even future, financial crises. To assess whether it is possible to successfully leverage these lessons to other financial crises many authors have compared Japan’s crisis with the current financial crisis. Such comparisons have revealed considerable differences, leading several authors to assert that the fundamentals of Japan’s crisis are too distinctive, limiting the applicability of Japan’s experience beyond the generic level.

Hoshi (2008) has pointed out that Japan’s problem was essentially nonperforming loans affecting the solvency of the commercial banking system. Conversely, in the US, the source of the crisis has been a housing market bubble involving subprime loans and mortgage-backed securities with very complex financial structures. Therefore, compared to Japan’s crisis, what is happening in the US is much more of a market liquidity problem, as it also is in Europe and the UK (Hoshi, 2008). Moreover, he highlights that in Japan stock prices peaked and collapsed just before real estate prices, while in the US the two happened almost simultaneously.

Similarly, Sheard (2008) has stressed that the reach of the current crisis is much greater than it was in Japan. Whereas Japan’s crisis was primarily a local phenomenon, the current crisis has had global consequences, since bad assets were securitized and spread throughout the global financial system. He concludes that the current crisis is a far more complex problem to address compared to the Japanese crisis, and this limits the applicability of lessons distilled from Japan. In this respect he adopts a similar view to that of Akio Makabe, an economics professor at Shinshu University, who remarks that “The Japanese policymakers of yesterday designed their bank resolution policies in a more stable macroeconomic and financial global setting” (JETRO, 2009, February Newsletter, p.3).

Furthermore, the view that the applicability of Japan’s lessons is limited is touched upon by Kobayashi (2008b) who notes that Japan’s problems were concentrated in about twenty financial institutions, where as the current crisis affects a large number of banks and many nonbank financial actors. Kobayashi also highlights that today public trust in the financial system and its agents is extremely low; a sharp contrast to Japan in the 1990’s.

However, analytical research on the comparative aspects of both crises also reveals striking similarities. For instance, the causes of the two crises are sufficiently similar. Cooper (2001) notes that the impulses driving the boom that preceded both crises can be traced to financial innovations and some form of financial liberalization, setting off a credit boom that fuelled rapid increases in asset prices, particularly house prices (Cooper, 2001). Moreover, he also points out that both booms were supported by lax monetary and fiscal policies and that in either case financial supervision and regulations were inadequate to prevent the emergence of large financial imbalances. Hoshi (2008) highlights the similarity that both Japan and the US experienced the unexpected failure of one of their largest financial institutions; Yamaichi Securities in Japan and Lehman Brothers in the US, which in both cases led to a spike in interbank loan rates.

Moreover, broader studies of the comparative aspects of financial crises indicate that financial crises are inherently similar. Of particular interest is a recent paper (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008) which surveys a broad array of data to compare the scope and impact of the US subprime crisis with a number of previous financial crises, including the Japanese financial crisis. The paper asserts that the subprime crisis shares striking similarities with the financial crises that have preceded it, particularly in the run-up of asset prices, in debt accumulation, in growth patterns, and in current account deficits. The authors conclude that whilst the situation of the US is slightly different, in many ways, the mechanisms behind the crisis remain the same.

Hence, despite the idiosyncratic aspects, most economists believe that the Japanese model of bank resolution can serve as a source of guidance for countries facing financial crisis. Thus, Japan’s experiences can be seen to be relevant for other countries currently experiencing similar problems because they go to the heart of what a financial crisis is.

I.V Literature examining whether any of the lessons are being applied in the current financial crisis.


With the knowledge that lessons from Japan can be used as a form of guidance for countries facing financial crisis, the question arises; have countries dealing with the current financial crisis learned from Japan’s experience?
The economist Paul Sheard (2009) of Nomura Securities International, asserts that countries such as the US and UK are certainly behaving as if they have. He highlights the fact that in both countries, policymakers are acting aggressively on all fronts. “Fiscal, monetary, banking system and housing policy have all been mobilized to tackle the financial crisis, restore liquidity to financial markets, prevent deflation, and to end the recession” (East Asia Foundation Journal, Vol 4, No 1, Spring).

Moreover, Sheard (2009) suggests that the policymakers have learnt from Japan’s mistake of delayed intervention. Focusing on the US, he draws attention to the fact that it took just over one and a half years for the Government to put in place a large scale bank recapitalization framework (the Troubled Assets Relief Program), where as it took Japan roughly seven years to get to that point (Sheard, 2009). Similarly, he notes that by October 2008, the Federal Government had doubled the size of its balance sheet and engaged in a quantitative-easing strategy. In contrast, it took Japan over a decade to establish its quantitative-easing policy, and under it, the Bank of Japan only expanded the size of its balance sheet by about 35% and took about three years to do so (Sheard, 2009). This view is further supported by Tokyo based analyst Richard Jerram of Macquarie Securities who noted “the speed and aggression of the US response gives hope that it will avoid following the path of Japan in the 1990s” (JETRO, 2009, February Newsletter, p.3).

Furthermore, the view that the US has learnt from Japan’s experience is supported by the fact that Federal Chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson have explained that they formulated their responses to the current financial crisis after considering past crises (Faiola and Cho, 2008). In particular they looked at the US savings and loan episode of the 1980s and the bursting of Japan's economic bubble. From their analysis, they ultimately decided that the response to the current crisis needed to be a fast and substantial, two of the core lessons derived from Japan’s policy failures (Faiola and Cho, 2008). Furthermore, when the US Treasury planned the $700 billion bailout package (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008) to address the financial crisis, it reportedly examined the experience of Japan from when it grappled with its banking crisis (Nanto, 2008). Moreover, as the US acts on the lessons obtained from Japan, so do other countries around the world follow suit (Kobayashi, 2009). The UK and many European countries have responded with similar vigour and aggression. Regarding the UK, Adam Posen (2009), a member of the monetary policy committee and Bank of England, highlights the speed and vigour with which monetary policy has responded in the wake of crisis.

Although US and European policymakers have responded to the ongoing crisis with much greater alacrity than did Japanese policymakers, at this stage it remains to be seen whether global policymakers have effectively attacked the underlying problem of bad debt (Kobayashi, 2009). Some analysts, such as Kobayashi (2009), feel that the US and Europe have failed to recognize one of the most important lessons from Japan’s experience; that market confidence can only be restored when progress is made on the painstaking process of disposing of nonperforming assets. He suggests that, whilst fiscal stimulus will help economies it will not resolve the crisis. He suggests that once the ‘painkilling’ effect wears off, US and European economies will plunge back into crisis. In this regard, US and European policymakers can be seen to be repeating the mistakes of Japanese policymakers, acting slowly to tackle the daunting task of solving nonperforming asset problems, clinging to wishful thinking by hoping that all of the current global economic problems will solve themselves in due time (Kobayashi, 2009).

Nevertheless, it is clear that global policymakers have taken onboard many of the lessons derived from Japan’s experience. Cementing the fact that the Japanese model of bank resolution has become a precedent for country’s formulating their own responses. However, literature detailing these issues has not yet had time to properly developed due to the contemporary nature of the current crisis.

Concluding Statements

In conclusion, academic research detailing the nature and causes of the Japanese crisis, as well as the policy responses implemented to resolve it, are well documented. However, there has been much less scholarly focus on extrapolating lessons from the crisis and very few authors have examined whether they are being applied to tackle the current financial crisis. Moreover, as the effects of the current crisis are still being digested, few authors have yet examined whether there is evidence of an improved response. This paper will attempt to go beyond the limits of existing literature by examining whether the lessons from Japan’s experience have been taken into consideration of governments addressing the current financial crisis. In this regard, this paper is intended to act as a basis for further discussions concerning effective crisis prevention and management to address potential financial disturbances.

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Pectus Excavatum

Thursday, 12 August 2010

Bankrupcy

If you have debt problems, you may be thinking about the possibility of bankruptcy; it isn't permanent, so you may choose it as a way of clearing your debts and making a fresh start. However, it's important to understand what bankruptcy is, you certainly shouldn't think of bankruptcy as being an easy way out because it certainly is not.

What is Bankruptcy?

Bankruptcy is a legally declared inability of an individual or business to pay its creditors, and can be a way of clearing debts that cannot be paid. It is possible for creditors to file a bankruptcy petition against a debtor (involuntary bankruptcy) in an effort to retain a portion of the debt which they are owed. However, in the majority of cases bankruptcy is initiated by the debtor (a voluntary bankruptcy). When an individual or business files for bankruptcy, all excess income and their non-essential assets, i.e. their property and possessions, are used to pay off creditors. At the end of the bankruptcy period, most of the debt is then discharged, allowing the debtors to make a fresh start; having shed the chains of debt, but at a significant cost.

Many people in modern society know people who have filed for or been affected by bankruptcy, it is becoming an increasingly common feature of today's borrow to buy culture. However, not many people completely understand the bankruptcy process, and hence are unable to deduce whether it is a good decision. If you are in a financially unstable position and are considering filing for bankruptcy yourself, or just looking to learn more about it, there are a few crucial points which you should be aware of.

Who is it Right for?

Bankruptcy is a serious matter; you'll have to give up your home and possessions of value. Whilst it gives you a fresh start, it is important to note that you will have to start from with nothing. Bankruptcy destroys your credit rating and as a result you will not be able to get a loan, any line of credit or financing for at least seven years. This is simply because creditors will be able to see that you have previously filed for bankruptcy and will refuse to enter into business with you.

However, you don't have to become bankrupt just because you're in debt. You can try to make arrangements with your creditors instead. For instance you can form an individual voluntary arrangement, where an insolvency practitioner helps you negotiate repayment terms. Many other repayment agreements exist and should be looked into before you make you final decision. To do this, it is often advisable to take the time to talk to a professional; they can take a look at your financial situation and determine the best course of action given your current situation and your debt levels. In some situations they may advise that you file for bankruptcy and will help you by providing you with detailed bankruptcy information.

where to looki for bankruptcy information

The economy is constantly fluctuating in the world we live in, we all go through rough patches from time to time; an unforeseen emergency, you may lose your job, or possibly face a barrage of unexpected bills. If you end up falling behind on your debt payments and are unsure of how best to deal with the debt that seems to be mounting up, then you may want to consider filing for bankruptcy,. But before you file for bankruptcy it is important that you find out all you can about bankruptcy law information. However, this doesn't have to cost the earth; there are a number of places you can visit to get free bankruptcy information. This article will attempt to outline some of the best ways to get your hands on some free bankruptcy information.

The Library

The library is a great place to go to if you want to find free bankruptcy information. The library will offer you a range of resources from books on bankruptcy information to releases from the federal government. What’s more, the resources which you will find in the library are free. Even if a library does not have a certain book in its inventory, it will be able to order it from another library. Furthermore, library’s employ staff who will be willing to help you to find the best attainable free bankruptcy information.

The Internet

If you are looking for free bankruptcy information, the internet is a great place to turn too. On the World Wide Web, with just the click of a mouse, you can gain access to articles from experts and professionals about the bankruptcy process and how it will likely affect your finances. Moreover, it is not hard to find blogs and forums containing people who have themselves, filed for bankruptcy and will be able to provide you with their experiences and additional detail regarding bankruptcy information. The internet is therefore, definitely worth a look.

A Bankruptcy Lawyer

A lawyer can be a great resource for finding free bankruptcy information; it is not necessary to hire a lawyer, you just need to get in contact with them for a quick chat, and they will be able to tell you if filing for bankruptcy is the right choice. Talking to a law professional is a great way to obtain free bankruptcy information; hence if you are looking for free bankruptcy information, then you should call or email some of your local lawyers to see who will explain the process and the laws that will affect you.

Car Insurance for Young People/teens

If your son/daughter has just got their driving licence, the chances are that they will want to spend some time behind the wheel of your car as you worry over their safety and high auto insurance premiums. It is no secret that teenagers are far more likely to be involved in an accident than any other driver. This means premiums for young drivers are very high. This is why it is so important that you search around for cheap car insurance quotes, just as with any type of insurance; be it home insurance or life insurance. And you can start now with the useful advice listed in this article.

Firstly, you should add your teen driver up to your policy, instead of creating a seperate one. It may seem ridiculous to do so, since they will ramp up your insurance premium. However, it’s cheaper this way, since you will actually save money by signing up a new driver to your auto insurance policy. Also, to keep cost down even further, you and your teen should also do the following:

Practice safe driving. This applies to both you and your son/daughter. Your teen may be an inexperienced driver, but you are his ultimate role model. Therefore, you should be a living example to how to drive appropriately on the road. If both of you doing this together will help keep your auto insurance cost down even further.

Maintain good grades. Your teen may be going through school, and you want the best from him or her. And your auto insurance company does, also. Many companys offer a “good student” discount. It will lower your premium and might help your son/daughter to maintain good grades.

Buy an older/cheeper car. Older vehicles are less expensive, which is ideal for your teen to learn todrive. Any expensive vehicles should be driven by you, the experienced driver, since these actions will reduce premium costs.

Have your teen take driver’s education. This course will help teens drive better on the road, and auto insurance companies will give you and your teen a discount, if he or she passes.

Raise the deductible { voluntary excess ) on your policy. Your voluntary excess is what you pay when you claim, your insurer pays the rest. Your voluntary excess should be raised to lower your premium.

Remember to drop their coverage when your son/daughter goes to college. When your teen goes to college, most likely – unless they commute from home – they will not need to be on your auto insurance plan, if they plan on buying their own car insurance policy. No matter what though, teens must have a car insurance policy, since it’s against the law to drive without one.

Shop around for insurer's. Perhaps it’s time to switch insurers, if your current provider is giving you a high rate. It will allow you and your sibling to find a rate that’s fair and reasonable, especially if the new policy has a great coverage plan.

These tips will help reduce costs associated with young drivers. Be sure to also question your insurance agent about discounts or other cost-reducing strategies.